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On Sat, 08 Dec 2007 20:14:33 -0600, Vic Smith
wrote: On Sun, 09 Dec 2007 01:36:36 GMT, Short Wave Sportfishing wrote: On Sat, 8 Dec 2007 19:06:07 -0500, "Eisboch" wrote: Here's the "what comes first, the chicken or the egg" question though: Does the technology produce the vulnerability or does the ever expanding services made available by the technology make themselves vulnerable? In my view it's the technology itself that produces the vulnerability. Complexity follows the rules of unintended consequences - for every intended expansion or result, you get four unintended consequences. The problem is that you can't define what those unintended results will be and that's where the exploitation or fault exists. I don't think that's true on the unintended results. Not to say snowballs don't happen, but most complex systems are well thought out. Malicious exploitation is another matter entirely. I respect your opinion, but even well thought out systems can fail spectacularly and often for the simplest reasons. January 28, 1986 - Shuttle Challenger blew up when an O ring failed in the rocket booster igniting the liquid hydrogen. February 1, 2003 - Shuttle Columbia disintegrated on reentry after a piece of foam broke off the hydrogen tank striking the left leading wing edge. I'm sure we can agree that space shuttles are very complex systems with triple and even quadruple system redundancies. Yet, even with the redundancies, both were laid low by simple mechanical failure. I don't think you can reign in technology or it's application. We may be required to rethink what and how much of what we want to make dependent on it. That's a good point and something that I think is missing from the equation of technological advance. Access to information is instant. There isn't time to absorb and process the information - to think and/or ask questions. Last week, for example, there was a pipeline fire in Michigan which was reported as "major" - the implication was that all four of the lines from Canada were involved - the price of oil jumped $3 bucks and change in seconds. Couple of hours later it was only two involved and finally, one and it turned out not to be "major" at all - the line was down for a day. Prices returned down, but the settlement for the day was about .80¢ higher - restablishing an up trend instead of the prior down trend based on lack of news. Back when, it would have taken time to react. Questions would have been asked, calls made, etc. The event wouldn't have impacted because time would have been taken to find out what happened. That has completely changed and is one unintended consequence of instant access which speculators can exploit to their advantage. That kind of crap happened on trading board floors since people started yakking and learned the power of rumor. It's simple irresponsibility and greed, not technology. Really? Well, allow me to introduce you to something called programmed trading and specifically October 19, 1987. While there is still some debate over the exact causes, the most respected reports on Black Monday (the 1987 one) "Brady Report" by Nicholas Brady and Mark Carlson's "A Brief History of the 1987 Stock Market Crash..." state without reservation that programmed trading at the minimum was responsible for 50% of the total decline and introduced the negative psychology inherent in any stock/market fluctuation. Other factors were portfolio insurance selling, the arbitrage potential between commodity markets and stocks and a flaw in the European Bourses because of a major weather event. As you are a "what if" guy and knowledgeable on the subject, I'm sure you can recognize it as classic cascade failure. Since then, limits have been placed on programmed trading to limit the type of cascade failure seen on October 19,1987. but there are still flaws in the system - fortunately, humans now have the ability to intervene. Instead of mindless trading, human perspective is brought into the trading equation. Tying the 80 cent gain to that BS is a stretch too. If you listen to the myriad "reasons" that "analysts" give to any market gains or losses, it never makes much sense unless it is tied to real fundamentals. The pipeline didn't even qualify to move the market. Yak yak yak. Greed, greed, greed. No it's not just greed. It's a case of resetting expectations and market psychology. It's instant information that makes the scenario plausible and instant reaction causes the rise and fall. And, for the record, yes - rumors have been and continue to be an important part of any trading cycle - that's a given - can't argue that. But, and this is very important, under the old system, it took time to develop and rationalize a rumor which would affect market movement or even any particular stock movement - it was "soft" information - ethereal if you will - that was always suspect. With instant, theoretically "hard" information, the reactions are also instant and without buffering. That will establish a higher floor, in particular in commodities, if only because of the inherent psychology of limiting losses - a group think gestalt would be another way to put it. On the flip side, real info gets to real people, not just insiders, quickly. Which does what? Think about what you said - real people get "real" info - or is it "real"? Was that Michigan information that moved the market "real"? If you are a casual day trader and heard that, what would be your reaction? Be honest - you are trading commodities and hear that half of the Midwest's oil supply has blown up - what do you do?0 Those of us that are getting long in the tooth will be satisfied with less, but imagine explaining to a 16 year old that they really don't need a cell phone. Agreed. Which, I guess, is exactly what your point is. I doesn't matter though. The genie is out of the lamp and there's no turning back. I agree with that, but you still have to at least try to anticipate the results if the Endless Knot we have created dissolves or breaks in multiple places. When you consider current complexities and that things aren't breaking down left and right, it's clear that contingency planning and backup strategies are well established for most infrastructures. Contingency plans are exactly that - contingencies that we can think of. In any complex system, it isn't what you plan for that fails - it's always the one thing you didn't plan for but in hindsight, was the most obvious and glaring defect. It's human nature. I know "what ifs" were always a significant part of my job. It's always going to get down to having thoughtful people in the right spots. But sometimes the **** will hit the fan anyway. Well, we will probably continue to agree to disagree. :) |
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