By Ray Perry

In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the
firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in
which their subordinates, the two subs? commanding officers, had also
been relieved of command (?Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax??,
DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).

Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian
tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months
later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of
command, but the two officers who commanded their respective
submarine squadrons were also fired.

On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided
with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending
to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the
USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the
Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.


In both cases, the commanding officers? superiors were on board the
sub at the time of the mishap.

However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the
collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training
Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was
also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber,
the Pacific Submarine Force?s chief of staff was on board throughout
the day of the collision.

This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail
the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville
incident.

When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander
Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court ?is directed to inquire
into all facts and circumstances of the collision.? At the same time
the order directed the court to ?examine and make findings as to
whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent
the chain of events leading to the collision.?

However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never
asked whether Brandhuber?s presence might have contributed to the
chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron
commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their
accidents.

The following disturbing information can readily be found in the
Court of Inquiry record:

* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to
test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement
that the ship was at test depth.

Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events
that the ship?s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.

* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise
even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the
former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just
as a visitor.

* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship?s CO and
ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.

Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the
Greeneville?s control room right before the collision.

Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st
Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in
whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor.
Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were
free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at
a critical moment?

In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of
the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after
the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution
that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation
between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive
officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that
although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the
body language of Waddle and his executive officer.

Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub?s navigator, noted in his written statement
to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided
not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question,
with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule,
why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously
decided to skip it?

With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the
obvious questions:

Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you
appear to have earlier chosen not to do it??

Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the
emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as
directing him to do the emergency blow??

I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask
because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding
Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in
such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this
senior officer?s role onboard Greeneville that day.

As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival
several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the
schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it
in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could
not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-
blow evolution on his card.

Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a
senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle
up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like,
?Slow down, skipper, slow down.?

A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely
know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good
impression made on a retired four star?s civilian guests. Paperwork
or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.

Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under ?inspection?
at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific
Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing
custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.

Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo
outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to
the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and
simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these
automatically.

Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an
inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no
authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were
telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber
what he thought his authority was.

However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise ? that Brandhuber
clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville?s commander.
This was Brandhuber?s testimony that in the aftermath of the
collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt
that there was no need to do so.

It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record
that Waddle?s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship,
and Waddle knew this, was the crew?s ability to continue to perform
professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian
visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical
moment?

The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force
was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:

Waddle?s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution
as stated by the navigator.

* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville
that day in the face of their misgivings.

* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by
key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.

* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.

* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt.
Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle ? and therefore any
culpability stemming from the collision.

The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely
critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force
chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen
(including four students) from the Ehime Maru.

And why was he let off the hook?