By Ray Perry

In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the
firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in
which their subordinates, the two subs? commanding officers, had also
been relieved of command (?Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax??,
DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).

Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian
tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months
later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of
command, but the two officers who commanded their respective
submarine squadrons were also fired.

On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided
with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending
to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the
USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the
Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.


In both cases, the commanding officers? superiors were on board the
sub at the time of the mishap.

However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the
collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training
Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was
also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber,
the Pacific Submarine Force?s chief of staff was on board throughout
the day of the collision.

This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail
the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville
incident.

When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander
Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court ?is directed to inquire
into all facts and circumstances of the collision.? At the same time
the order directed the court to ?examine and make findings as to
whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent
the chain of events leading to the collision.?

However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never
asked whether Brandhuber?s presence might have contributed to the
chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron
commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their
accidents.

The following disturbing information can readily be found in the
Court of Inquiry record:

* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to
test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement
that the ship was at test depth.

Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events
that the ship?s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.

* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise
even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the
former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just
as a visitor.

* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship?s CO and
ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.

Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the
Greeneville?s control room right before the collision.

Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st
Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in
whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor.
Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were
free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at
a critical moment?

In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of
the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after
the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution
that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation
between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive
officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that
although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the
body language of Waddle and his executive officer.

Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub?s navigator, noted in his written statement
to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided
not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question,
with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule,
why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously
decided to skip it?

With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the
obvious questions:

Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you
appear to have earlier chosen not to do it??

Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the
emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as
directing him to do the emergency blow??

I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask
because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding
Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in
such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this
senior officer?s role onboard Greeneville that day.

As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival
several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the
schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it
in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could
not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-
blow evolution on his card.

Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a
senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle
up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like,
?Slow down, skipper, slow down.?

A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely
know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good
impression made on a retired four star?s civilian guests. Paperwork
or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.

Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under ?inspection?
at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific
Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing
custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.

Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo
outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to
the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and
simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these
automatically.

Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an
inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no
authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were
telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber
what he thought his authority was.

However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise ? that Brandhuber
clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville?s commander.
This was Brandhuber?s testimony that in the aftermath of the
collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt
that there was no need to do so.

It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record
that Waddle?s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship,
and Waddle knew this, was the crew?s ability to continue to perform
professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian
visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical
moment?

The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force
was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:

Waddle?s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution
as stated by the navigator.

* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville
that day in the face of their misgivings.

* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by
key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.

* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.

* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt.
Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle ? and therefore any
culpability stemming from the collision.

The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely
critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force
chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen
(including four students) from the Ehime Maru.

And why was he let off the hook?

Perhaps because he was at the time a staff officer exercising no, repeat no,
command over the sub commander?

Butch
"starwars" wrote in message
elinux.net...
By Ray Perry

In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the
firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in
which their subordinates, the two subs? commanding officers, had also
been relieved of command (?Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax??,
DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).

Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian
tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months
later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of
command, but the two officers who commanded their respective
submarine squadrons were also fired.

On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided
with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending
to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the
USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the
Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.


In both cases, the commanding officers? superiors were on board the
sub at the time of the mishap.

However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the
collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training
Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was
also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber,
the Pacific Submarine Force?s chief of staff was on board throughout
the day of the collision.

This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail
the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville
incident.

When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander
Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court ?is directed to inquire
into all facts and circumstances of the collision.? At the same time
the order directed the court to ?examine and make findings as to
whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent
the chain of events leading to the collision.?

However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never
asked whether Brandhuber?s presence might have contributed to the
chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron
commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their
accidents.

The following disturbing information can readily be found in the
Court of Inquiry record:

* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to
test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement
that the ship was at test depth.

Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events
that the ship?s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.

* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise
even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the
former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just
as a visitor.

* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship?s CO and
ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.

Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the
Greeneville?s control room right before the collision.

Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st
Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in
whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor.
Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were
free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at
a critical moment?

In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of
the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after
the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution
that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation
between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive
officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that
although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the
body language of Waddle and his executive officer.

Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub?s navigator, noted in his written statement
to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided
not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question,
with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule,
why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously
decided to skip it?

With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the
obvious questions:

Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you
appear to have earlier chosen not to do it??

Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the
emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as
directing him to do the emergency blow??

I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask
because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding
Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in
such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this
senior officer?s role onboard Greeneville that day.

As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival
several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the
schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it
in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could
not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-
blow evolution on his card.

Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a
senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle
up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like,
?Slow down, skipper, slow down.?

A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely
know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good
impression made on a retired four star?s civilian guests. Paperwork
or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.

Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under ?inspection?
at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific
Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing
custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.

Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo
outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to
the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and
simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these
automatically.

Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an
inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no
authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were
telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber
what he thought his authority was.

However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise ? that Brandhuber
clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville?s commander.
This was Brandhuber?s testimony that in the aftermath of the
collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt
that there was no need to do so.

It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record
that Waddle?s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship,
and Waddle knew this, was the crew?s ability to continue to perform
professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian
visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical
moment?

The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force
was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:

Waddle?s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution
as stated by the navigator.

* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville
that day in the face of their misgivings.

* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by
key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.

* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.

* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt.
Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle ? and therefore any
culpability stemming from the collision.

The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely
critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force
chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen
(including four students) from the Ehime Maru.

And why was he let off the hook?

I'll first admit that I have no military experience, no experience being the
captain of a large vessel much less a sub, etc., etc. So maybe my uninformed
thoughts are totally off base. But, of course, you asked in a general
largely recreational boating group, so that's what you get.....

Now, on the one hand I can understand a concept like, "Upper management is,
ultimately, repsonsible for everything." In some general way, any problem
withing any organization is the problem and responsibility of the people at
the very top. They should be managing, creating review teams, creating
procedures, investing in technology, etc., etc., to prevent problems.

But that is not the tone of your article.

The way I read you notes here make me think of this sitution: I'm the driver
of a car. Maybe a hired limo driver. I have the governor, the head of the
State Police, and the head of the Registry of Motor Vehicles all in the car.
Then I make an illegal left turn and get in a accident and kill someone. Or
I'm speeding down the pike doing 75 in a 65 and get in an accident and kill
someone. Do all these officials have some blame?? Well maybe. They could
have been watching me. They could have put more rules in place. They could
have put more police cruisers running radar checks. They could have mandated
vehicles that are incabable of speeding or making illegal turns. But I knew
the rules. I was in command of the vehicle. It is, ultimately, my fault.

As an aside: It amazes me that a multi Billion dollar sub with a crew of
over a hundred men, that has not other mission (like fishing or cargo
transport) than to know where it is and how to shoot it's weapons - and that
has the most sophisticated sonar and other equipment in the world with the
sole reason to be able to detect other ships (and usually other subs that
are TRYING to hide)......it amazes me that they can, even with some
negligence, miss "seeing" a 130 foot fishing boat that is surely making all
kinds of noise. It's as if a trained marksman on the shooting range
accidentially shot a by stander that was standing 20 feet away, behind him,
and talking loudly.


"starwars" wrote in message
elinux.net...
By Ray Perry

In a recent article, I examined the leadership issues involved in the
firing of two senior Navy officers following submarine accidents in
which their subordinates, the two subs? commanding officers, had also
been relieved of command (?Why Are Navy COs Getting the Ax??,
DefenseWatch, March 2, 2004).

Following the collision of the USS Oklahoma City with a Norwegian
tanker in late 2002, and the grounding of the USS Hartford 11 months
later, not only did the two skippers find themselves relieved of
command, but the two officers who commanded their respective
submarine squadrons were also fired.

On Nov. 13, 2002, the attack submarine USS Oklahoma City collided
with a Norwegian tanker in the straits of Gibraltar while ascending
to periscope depth. Less than a year after that, a sister ship, the
USS Hartford strayed into shallow water while training in the
Mediterranean Sea and ran aground on Oct. 25, 2003.


In both cases, the commanding officers? superiors were on board the
sub at the time of the mishap.

However, in a far more controversial submarine accident in 2001, the
collision of the USS Greeneville with the Japanese Fisheries Training
Ship Ehime Maru, a senior Pacific Submarine Force staff officer was
also embarked at the time of the accident. Capt. Robert Brandhuber,
the Pacific Submarine Force?s chief of staff was on board throughout
the day of the collision.

This anomaly piqued my interest, and I decided to review in detail
the records of the Navy Court of Inquiry into the Greeneville
incident.

When he ordered the Court of Inquiry, then-Pacific Fleet commander
Adm. Thomas B. Fargo stated that the court ?is directed to inquire
into all facts and circumstances of the collision.? At the same time
the order directed the court to ?examine and make findings as to
whether [Capt. Brandhuber] was in a position to intervene and prevent
the chain of events leading to the collision.?

However, my analysis of the proceedings reveals that the court never
asked whether Brandhuber?s presence might have contributed to the
chain of events as it appeared to have happened with the two squadron
commanders aboard the Oklahoma City and Hartford during their
accidents.

The following disturbing information can readily be found in the
Court of Inquiry record:

* Brandhuber testified that he was unaware of the sub proceeding to
test depth until he heard the general announcing system announcement
that the ship was at test depth.

Brandhuber stated that he harbored concerns about the pace of events
that the ship?s captain, Cmdr. Scott Waddle, was driving.

* Brandhuber stated that he had not asked to go on this DV cruise
even though it was sponsored by retired Adm. Richard Macke, the
former commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

* Brandhuber stated that he was not on board as an inspector but just
as a visitor.

* Brandhuber stated that at no time did he seek out the ship?s CO and
ask for any special treatment or reports of any kind.

Other testimony points to an atmosphere of unusual tension within the
Greeneville?s control room right before the collision.

Why was an enlisted crew member such as Fire Control Technician 1st
Class Patrick Thomas Seacrest so subdued in his response to a CO in
whom he apparently held such confidence? He was a hotshot sailor.
Waddle in his own testimony had made it clear that his people were
free to provide contrary information. Why did this man stand mute at
a critical moment?

In statements to the National Transportation Safety Board, several of
the civilian passengers noted some odd behavior by Cmdr. Waddle after
the high-speed maneuvering but before the emergency-blow evolution
that ended in the collision. One specifically noted a conversation
between Waddle and Lt. Cmdr. Gerald K. Pfeifer, his executive
officer, just prior to the evolution. The civilian noted that
although he did not hear the conversation, it was clearly odd by the
body language of Waddle and his executive officer.

Lt. Keith Sloan, the sub?s navigator, noted in his written statement
to the preliminary inquiry officer that the CO had initially decided
not to do the Emergency Blow evolution. This raises the question,
with all of the interfering evolutions and the delay in the schedule,
why did the CO order the emergency blow after he had previously
decided to skip it?

With the key people in front of them, why did the Court not ask the
obvious questions:

Cmdr. Waddle, why did you choose to do the emergency blow when you
appear to have earlier chosen not to do it??

Capt. Brandhuber, did you in any way direct the CO to conduct the
emergency blow? Or say anything that the skipper might interpret as
directing him to do the emergency blow??

I believe these to be critical questions that the Court did not ask
because the charter imposed upon them was narrowly drafted regarding
Capt. Brandhuber. This begs the question of why it was drawn up in
such a way as to essentially preclude a critical examination of this
senior officer?s role onboard Greeneville that day.

As an embarked senior officer, Brandhuber was given on arrival
several 3 x 5 cards with key information including one with the
schedule of events for the day. He surely read it and then tucked it
in his pocket, referring to it several more times that day. He could
not have failed to notice both the test-depth event and the emergency-
blow evolution on his card.

Based on my experience over a 29-year naval career, I know that a
senior captain such as Brandhuber would never be reluctant to sidle
up to a more junior officer and quietly tell him something like,
?Slow down, skipper, slow down.?

A senior captain who is in an admiral-making job would also surely
know that he can add points to his resume by assisting in the good
impression made on a retired four star?s civilian guests. Paperwork
or not, I believe Brandhuber consciously chose to attend these guests.

Any skipper worth his salt knows that his ship is under ?inspection?
at all times. Treating any embarked senior, such as the Pacific
Submarine Force chief of staff, properly is not only a long-standing
custom but to fail to do so is just plain dumb.

Such a senior person on board, particularly one with a detailed memo
outlining expected customs and courtesies, would not have to speak to
the CO to get what he wanted. The long-standing custom is clear and
simple: The skipper would not ask. He would provide these
automatically.

Curiously, members of the Greeneville Court of Inquiry spent an
inordinate amount of time explaining why they felt Brandhuber had no
authority over Waddle that day. Their comments suggest that they were
telling this to Brandhuber himself. Moreover, no one asked Brandhuber
what he thought his authority was.

However, one entry in the record suggests otherwise ? that Brandhuber
clearly did think he had authority over the Greeneville?s commander.
This was Brandhuber?s testimony that in the aftermath of the
collision he did consider relieving Waddle of command, but then felt
that there was no need to do so.

It is clear from both news accounts and the Court of Inquiry record
that Waddle?s crew respected him enormously. The mark of a good ship,
and Waddle knew this, was the crew?s ability to continue to perform
professionally with the unavoidable distraction posed by civilian
visitors on board. Why would they become so subdued at a critical
moment?

The following evidence causes me to conclude that some other force
was at work on the Greeneville that day. This includes:

Waddle?s initial decision not to do the Emergency Surfacing evolution
as stated by the navigator.

* The passivity of good sailors and officers on board Greeneville
that day in the face of their misgivings.

* The statements by the civilian guests regarding odd behavior by
key people just prior to the ill-fated emergency surfacing evolution.

* The passivity of key witnesses under examination by the Court.

* The seemingly extraordinary effort by the court to deny that Capt.
Brandhuber had any authority over Cmdr. Waddle ? and therefore any
culpability stemming from the collision.

The Court of Inquiry appears to have adroitly avoided an absolutely
critical question: To what degree was the Pacific Submarine Force
chief of staff responsible for the accident that killed nine crewmen
(including four students) from the Ehime Maru.

And why was he let off the hook?

"Gary Warner" wrote in message
...

/good stuff snipped/
As an aside: It amazes me that a multi Billion dollar sub with a crew of
over a hundred men, that has not other mission (like fishing or cargo
transport) than to know where it is and how to shoot it's weapons - and
that
has the most sophisticated sonar and other equipment in the world with the
sole reason to be able to detect other ships (and usually other subs that
are TRYING to hide)......it amazes me that they can, even with some
negligence, miss "seeing" a 130 foot fishing boat that is surely making
all
kinds of noise. It's as if a trained marksman on the shooting range
accidentially shot a by stander that was standing 20 feet away, behind
him,
and talking loudly.

The transcripts actually had a lot of good information about this. If
you're
amazed that technology fails on a regular basis, then you clearly need to
learn more about technology (or watch the news a bit more).

On the matter of submarine sonar, the transcripts made it quite clear that
the aspect of a ship changes the amount of sound in the water, i.e. if the
ship is heading directly toward the sub, the sound will be very much muted.
What this means is that you cannot use sound to derive a distance to the
target. Then there was an educational description of TMA (Target Motion
Analysis) which is basically a process of moving the sub so that you can
get triangulation and determine target motion.

You may recall that there was some discussion about doing things too
rapidly, a little thought should make it clear that doing TMA to quickly
can lead to questionable results.

The analogy of shooting someone 20 feet away is off the mark quite a bit.
It was more like hearing someone, too far away to determine how far,
waiting a few minutes, and taking a shot. Still wrong, and the shooter is
completely at fault, but it wasn't like anyone knew the ship was there for
certain. They just did not know that it wasn't, and the CO of the sub was
responsible to know that it wasn't there, for a certainty.

I found the transcripts educational, but a tough read.

I still don't how the board let the Captain off so easy. Of course, I
wasn't there to hear all the evidence they heard.

Normally, the Senior Officer Present has a clear duty to take command in
times of peril if he thinks the situation is being handled improperly. I
was told that this particular Captain was a qualified submariner in that
type vessel (I think I even heard he was an ex-CO of one), so was fully
qualified in that regard.

The next question would be whether or not the Captain, given the surrouding
circumstances, should have known the situation was growing perilous. I
don't know the answer to this one. I would have had to hear all the
testimony and evidence before I could judge that part.

Was the Captain there onboard in uniform? If so, that is a sort of prima
facie evidence that he would have automatically been accorded honors and
deference by the Skipper. And, it adds weight to the idea that he should
have intervened, if he saw things getting out of hand.

It's a very interesting case and situation.

Took me a bit, but I finally was able to understand quite clearly that the
combination of large waves, distance from, and periscope limitations of the
sub, in heavy seas, all contributed to them not being able to detect the
Japanese vessle almost atop them. If the Japanese vessel was bow or stern
on, when scope sweeps were made, and either the sub. or the Japanese vessel,
or both, were down in a wave trough, it would have been easy to visually
miss them.

Lots of lines of coincidence converging in one place, at one time, to
produce a disaster.

"RB" wrote in message
...
I still don't how the board let the Captain off so easy. Of course, I
wasn't there to hear all the evidence they heard.

The Captain in question wasn't charged, so the board was not hearing
evidence
about his role, except as a witness.

Normally, the Senior Officer Present has a clear duty to take command in
times of peril if he thinks the situation is being handled improperly. I
was told that this particular Captain was a qualified submariner in that
type vessel (I think I even heard he was an ex-CO of one), so was fully
qualified in that regard.

The CO is assumed to be fully qualified for his job. A staff captain that
decides to
step in had better have his ducks in a row. As you point out below, the
situation that
day was very far from clear cut.

The case as made by the original poster wouldn't hold up in a kangaroo
court.
Without going into the detail, part of his narrative was a civilian
commenting on
"odd body language". If you're down to that, you got nothing.

Lance

The next question would be whether or not the Captain, given the
surrouding
circumstances, should have known the situation was growing perilous. I
don't know the answer to this one. I would have had to hear all the
testimony and evidence before I could judge that part.

Was the Captain there onboard in uniform? If so, that is a sort of prima
facie evidence that he would have automatically been accorded honors and
deference by the Skipper. And, it adds weight to the idea that he should
have intervened, if he saw things getting out of hand.

It's a very interesting case and situation.

Took me a bit, but I finally was able to understand quite clearly that the
combination of large waves, distance from, and periscope limitations of
the
sub, in heavy seas, all contributed to them not being able to detect the
Japanese vessle almost atop them. If the Japanese vessel was bow or stern
on, when scope sweeps were made, and either the sub. or the Japanese
vessel,
or both, were down in a wave trough, it would have been easy to visually
miss them.

Lots of lines of coincidence converging in one place, at one time, to
produce a disaster.

A question: Could a sub that was about to surface use active sonar, pinging,
to locate vessels? Well, I mean they certainly could do this, but would
that be
pretty effective even where just listening for engine/boat sounds and
looking
through the scope would not?

I realize that in an actual war-time you might not want to announce your
subs
location until you have actually surfaced. But in peace you are just about
to
surface and show the world where you are, so it's no big secret. And I
realize
that in drills you want to get as close to the real thing as possible...but
I'm sure
they don't really shoot live war-heads either. So why not a few pings to
hear
where the boats are??

"Gary Warner" wrote:

:I'll first admit that I have no military experience, no experience being the
:captain of a large vessel much less a sub, etc., etc. So maybe my uninformed
:thoughts are totally off base.

It is.

--
"It's over now, or so they say.
But sometimes it don't work out that way.
And you're never the same when you've been under fire."
-- Huey Lewis and the News "Walking On A Thin Line"

"Gary Warner" wrote:

:And I realize
:that in drills you want to get as close to the real thing as possible...but
:I'm sure they don't really shoot live war-heads either. So why not a few
ings to hear where the boats are??

Because you train like you fight. Otherwise you're just playing games
and wasting time and money. And yes, sometimes they really do shoot
live warheads.

--
"This is a war of the unknown warriors; but let all strive
without failing in faith or in duty...."

-- Winston Churchill

"Fred J. McCall" wrote in message
...
"Gary Warner" wrote:

:And I realize
:that in drills you want to get as close to the real thing as
possible...but
:I'm sure they don't really shoot live war-heads either. So why not a few
ings to hear where the boats are??

Because you train like you fight. Otherwise you're just playing games
and wasting time and money. And yes, sometimes they really do shoot
live warheads.

That's a load of crap.

Are you telling me people training in tanks have to really
shoot other tanks that have real people in them? Are you telling me that to
train for deploying nuclear missiles from a sub they have to shoot live
nuclear
missiles? Are you telling me that marksmen have to shoot live human targets
to be sure that they are up to the job when the time comes??

Of course not.

Even when they are testing something as important as shooting off a life
nuclear
missile someone on that boat knows it isn't real. And some key they use or
button
they press is different than what they would have to press for a real
war-head. It
might be almost 100% the same. But it is NOT the same. If it were 100%
identical
then, by definition, we'ld be shooting off live nuclear warheads.