There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

In article , says...

There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

The Nuclear Bomb is the great equalizer when it comes to international diplomacy. Most
countries understand this and that is why North Korea and Iran are doing everything they can
to get "the bomb." If a country has no "bomb" then they are not a credible threat to those
that do have the "bomb."

Iran will use our stupidity against us and they will prove they have the "bomb" by blowing up
something of medium importance and then the rest of the world will have to pay quite a bit of
attention to them.

The agreement is irrelevant to Iran, it is just diplomatic theater.

On Thu, 28 Nov 2013 09:41:19 -0500, "Mr. Luddite" wrote:

There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

I truly would not be upset if you responded directly to my posts.

We had a 'trust but verify' with N. Korea, no?

As for making a nuclear weapon that is a perfect specimen, perhaps the 90% is necessary. But, what
percent is needed for a low-yield, very dirty weapon?

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!

On Thu, 28 Nov 2013 10:09:50 -0500, BAR wrote:

In article , says...

There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

The Nuclear Bomb is the great equalizer when it comes to international diplomacy. Most
countries understand this and that is why North Korea and Iran are doing everything they can
to get "the bomb." If a country has no "bomb" then they are not a credible threat to those
that do have the "bomb."

Iran will use our stupidity against us and they will prove they have the "bomb" by blowing up
something of medium importance and then the rest of the world will have to pay quite a bit of
attention to them.

The agreement is irrelevant to Iran, it is just diplomatic theater.

And lots of folks love the Simpsons, especially the uneducated.

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!

On Thu, 28 Nov 2013 12:45:29 -0500, wrote:

On Thu, 28 Nov 2013 10:09:50 -0500, BAR wrote:

In article , says...

There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

The Nuclear Bomb is the great equalizer when it comes to international diplomacy. Most
countries understand this and that is why North Korea and Iran are doing everything they can
to get "the bomb." If a country has no "bomb" then they are not a credible threat to those
that do have the "bomb."

Iran will use our stupidity against us and they will prove they have the "bomb" by blowing up
something of medium importance and then the rest of the world will have to pay quite a bit of
attention to them.

The agreement is irrelevant to Iran, it is just diplomatic theater.

It is significant that the only country that has ever used the bomb
was the US and that we put everyone else on notice that if they used
one, we would consider it a provocation that allowed us to bomb them.
We certainly have a credible threat and we managed to keep the Soviets
at bay for 60 years. I doubt Iran, N Korea or Pakistan is really a
threat to us.
The only real threat is a terrorist who doesn't care who dies in
retaliation.

That is a *spectacular* point.

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!

On 11/28/2013 2:32 PM, John H. wrote:
On Thu, 28 Nov 2013 09:41:19 -0500, "Mr. Luddite" wrote:

There was recently a discussion here about the agreement with Iran
regarding their nuclear program. I expressed an opinion that unless
Iran demonstrated the ability to produce nuclear weapons, we should try
to make it work.

Someone ... I think it was John H ... questioned the agreement and my
opinion on it. He suggested that waiting to find out that they *had*
nuclear weapons would be a mistake and also that the weapons could end
up in the hands of others less responsible.

Here's the thing:

Enriching uranium to weapons grade is not a "one step" process. A
nuclear power plant uses uranium enriched to about 2-3 percent. Medical
use uranium is enriched a bit more. However weapons grade uranium must
be processed and enriched to 90 percent or more.

The agreement with Iran limits their enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
which makes it unusable for making weapons. Furthermore, trying to go
from 20 percent to 90 percent is a time consuming and laborious process.
It wouldn't happen overnight and with proper monitoring, it wouldn't
go unnoticed.

The success of the agreement is the "trust but verify" part. Iran has
agreed to international monitoring of their enrichment facilities. If
enrichment levels exceed 20 percent, flags will be raised well before
they obtained the necessary 90 percent level required to make a bomb.

I truly would not be upset if you responded directly to my posts.

We had a 'trust but verify' with N. Korea, no?

As for making a nuclear weapon that is a perfect specimen, perhaps the 90% is necessary. But, what
percent is needed for a low-yield, very dirty weapon?

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!



I didn't respond directly to your post because I had deleted it along
with all the others posted that day and didn't feel like going back to
search for it.

As far as "dirty" weapons ... they are already readily available. You
also can't make a "low yield" bomb unless you enrich far beyond 20 percent.

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 11:55:07 -0500, wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 10:20:42 -0500, John H.
wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 06:26:50 -0800 (PST), wrote:

That was from me, John H. I've no idea how that other name got there. I made the post through Google
Groups.

Wait, could be someone else who used the computer. Will have to check on that.

Yup. That was it!

Spoofer ;-)

No, it was a grandson. Had the whole crowd over for the big dinner yesterday. He was on Gmail and
didn't log off. So when I fired up Gmail this AM, I was using his account.

Let it be known that I did not read any of his emails!

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 12:47:58 -0500, John H wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 12:24:06 -0500, John H.
wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 11:55:07 -0500, wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 10:20:42 -0500, John H.
wrote:

On Fri, 29 Nov 2013 06:26:50 -0800 (PST), wrote:

That was from me, John H. I've no idea how that other name got there. I made the post through Google
Groups.

Wait, could be someone else who used the computer. Will have to check on that.

Yup. That was it!

Spoofer ;-)

No, it was a grandson. Had the whole crowd over for the big dinner yesterday. He was on Gmail and
didn't log off. So when I fired up Gmail this AM, I was using his account.

Let it be known that I did not read any of his emails!

John, we'd all LOVE to know how "you can be logged into Gmail" "using
his account", while posting to USENET through Supernews with AGENT,
which magically changed you user name and password in ToolsServers
and Accounts; twice!

Tell us all about it, spoofer.

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!

Mr. Spoofer. If I were Harry, I'd tell you I operate four computers and three servers with over 17
yottabytes of storage.

But, I'm not.

And, it's none of your f'ing business.

John H. -- Hope you're having a great day!