OK, Since Donal seems incapable of doing his own research I thought I might do
it for him.

Here are two reports on an incident between the Dover High Speed Ferry, and
another ferry in fog. Unfortunately, although both reports cite "failure to
keep a proper lookout" they aren't clear on what would have corrected that.
Since there were two visual lookouts posted, I assume the issue was with the
radar watch, which was clearly flawed. The Rule 19 violation I assume had to do
with not slowing when the radar image was distorted in the minute before the
collision. The comments seem to complain about a lapse of vigilance, as opposed
to inappropriate procedures.

I'm sure that Donal will say this supports his claims about the lack of
lookouts. However, I note that this was not considered a breach of Rule 6 "Safe
Speed," nor was there any other mention that the speed itself was a primary
cause. The high speed ferry was doing 38 knots earlier, and was still doing 29
at the time of the collision. The other ferry was doing 23 knots, I think. I
also found mention of a request of a follow-up study to generate guidelines for
a safe speed, but I haven't found any indication of this actually happening.

Enjoy the gift, Donal.



http://www.gnn.gov.uk/gnn/national.n...D?opendocument

8 April 2003

MASTER OF HIGH SPEED FERRY SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTED IN DOVER

At a hearing today at Dover Magistrates Court the Captain of the
Luxembourg registered high speed ferry "Diamant" was convicted of
failing to keep a proper lookout and failing to conduct his vessel
appropriately in fog.

The "Diamant", a high speed ferry operated by Hoverspeed on the Dover
- Ostend service, was approaching Dover at about 1000 on 6th January
2002 with 148 people on board. At that time the visibility was
reduced by dense fog. With 3.5 miles to go, and at a speed of about
30 knots, the "Diamant" collided with the outbound freight ferry
"Northern Merchant" which had 103 people on board. The investigation
by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency determined that the Captain had
failed to use his radar properly to determine the movements of the
"Northern Merchant" and on the basis of this mistake had effectively
turned into the other ship instead of away from it.

District Judge Riddle fined Jean Ramakers, a Belgian national, £1500
for the offence relating to lookout, and £1500 for the offence
relating to navigation in fog. Costs of £1500 were also awarded the
MCA.

Summing up, Judge Riddle said "This incident occurred in a busy
seaway and near a port, where the failure to keep a proper lookout
and to conduct a vessel properly can potentially have serious
consequences. This can range from a near miss to a catastrophic
incident. The highest standards of conduct must be expected of those
in charge of such ships. Even minor lapses must be accounted for and
punished, and cannot be ignored."

Captain John Garner, the MCA's Deputy Director of Operations and
Chairman of the UK High Speed Craft Advisory Group, said after the
case "The consequences of Captain Ramakers errors should send a clear
reminder to the operators, masters and crews of high speed ferries to
remain constantly vigilant and to maintain the highest professional
standards. Fog in the Dover Strait is common and the operation of a
high speed service must contain sufficient safety measures to
overcome the hazard to safe navigation that this can present"



http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga-ne...tions_2003.htm

Defendant: Jean Ramakers
Date of Offence: 6th January 2002
Offence: Failure to keep a proper lookout by all available means and failure to
conduct his vessel appropriately whilst in restricted visibility.

Details: This incident took place approximately 3 ½ miles east of the Eastern
entrance to Dover Harbour in thick fog on 6th January 2002. NORTHERN MERCHANT, a
UK flag truck ferry of 22152gt, had just left Dover for Dunkirk and was clearing
outbound traffic whilst increasing to passage speed. DIAMANT, a Luxembourg flag
Incat 81 type high-speed ferry, was inbound Dover from Ostend. In poor
visibility, DIAMANT struck the NORHTERN MERCHANT. There were no serious injuries
on board either vessel, but the damage to DIAMANT resulted in her withdrawal
from service for extended repairs to the bow and starboard prong.

DIAMANT had left Ostend as normal, but in reduced visibility. The bridge team,
Master, Chief Officer, Chief Engineer and lookout was supplemented by an
additional lookout. The passage proceeded under normal conditions until the
DIAMANT entered the English Inshore Traffic Zone at the CS4 buoy. At that point
the visibility had deteriorated further, and the Master, aware that his berth in
Dover was occupied, took the opportunity to reduce speed from 38 knots to 33
knots to delay his estimated time of arrival. It was at this time that both
Master and Chief Officer acquired the departing NORTHERN MERCHANT on ARPA. The
closest point of approach closed to 3 cables on the starboard quarter and a
slight alteration to port was made to open the point of approach. At this time
the Master believed that the NORTHERN MERHCANT was on a reciprocal course, and
allowed the range to close. The DIAMANT bridge team were well aware of the
developing situation and were looking and listening for the NORTHERN MERCHANT.
At about this point the fog signal from the NORTHERN MERCHANT was heard,
apparently to starboard, and both the Master and Chief Officer noted the radar
echo slightly distort radially, so that the bearing discrimination became
impossible. The master altered course to port to open the range. Some thirty
seconds later the NORTHERN MERCHANT appeared right ahead and beam on. An
emergency turn to port was initiated, which served to reduce the force of the
impact.


The defendant admitted to failing to keep a proper lookout and failure to
conduct his vessel appropriately whilst in restricted visibility, under the
following offences;
COLREG 5 (lookout)
COLREG 19 (conduct of vessels in restricted visibility).
Penalties: £1500 per offence and £1500 costs

I get the feeling that although he had ARPA, he failed to properly use
it. With ARPA there should have been no guess work ....course, speed,
CPA, Rel.motion should have been known.

otn

Something did not work properly with the radar procedures. In the aftermath,
they ran simulations with the ships and an action item that came out of that was
a meeting with the radar manufacturer to find out why it didn't work as it
should have.

Unfortunately, all the reports I found were rather terse - if it had been the
NTSB they would have listed model numbers, etc. The US reports however, are
usually fuzzy on the law until you get up to the appeals level.

One thing I found surprising while perusing the British "prosecution" reports
was the large number of boats prosecuted simply for not traveling properly in
the Dover TSS. One boat's defense was that their electronics failed and they
didn't have a paper backup, so they were also fined for not having a proper
chart.


"otnmbrd" wrote in message
hlink.net...
I get the feeling that although he had ARPA, he failed to properly use
it. With ARPA there should have been no guess work ....course, speed,
CPA, Rel.motion should have been known.

otn

For better or worse. here's the complete report on the Dover Ferry incident.
Note that this is not the court findings, nor do they feel bound be court
precedents, or make any attempt to place blame. The actual prosecution was
much more limited in scope, and only found fault under Rules 5 and 19.

It would be possible to find something in this report to support almost any
position.

On the issue of safe speed:

"Recognising that there is always a possibility that small vessels and other
floating objects might not be detected by radar at an adequate range (Rule
6(b)(iv)), it follows that a speed which relies on radar for detecting vessels
at a
sufficient range so as to be able to avoid collision, in accordance with the
Collision Regulations, should not be regarded as a safe speed.

"However, the practicality of following the above criterion in conditions of
severely restricted visibility is questionable (eg the need to maintain steerage
in
conditions of zero visibility). Additionally, the commercial viability of
shipping
would be in danger of being undermined if the criterion was strictly applied,
particularly in areas prone to restricted visibility.

"In view of the above, a more pragmatic approach might be appropriate, such
that a degree of reliance on radar for detection might be acceptable following a
reasoned assessment of the risks in doing so."

http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/group...ety_507877.pdf