The Forgery Fiasco

Today, special prosecutor Patrick Fitzgerald is expected to end his
long silence, possibly with the indictment of one or more
administration officials. But even as one chapter of the scandal draws
to a conclusion, a new one emerges. Reports in Italian newspapers have
refocused attention on the origins of the poorly forged documents
helped justify the 16 words from President Bush's 2003 State of the
Union address that started it all: "The British Government has learned
that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium
from Africa." Condoleezza Rice said subsequently, "knowing what we now
know, that some of the Niger documents were apparently forged, we
wouldn't have put this in the President's speech." Emerging information
casts doubt on Rice's portrayal of the administration as hapless
bystanders. There are strong indications that senior administration
officials and others with close ties to the White House had a far more
direct roll in the peddling of false intelligence.

THE STEPHEN HADLEY CONNECTION: The forged documents originated with the
Italian government. Nicolo Pollari, chief of Italy's military
intelligence service, peddled tales of Iraq seeking Uranium from Niger
to the CIA in 2001 and 2002 but his insistent overtures were
consistently rebuffed. On Tuesday, an "exclusive report in La
Repubblica reveal[ed] that Pollari met secretly in Washington on
September 9, 2002, with then-Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen
Hadley." (At the beginning of Bush's second term, Hadley was promoted
to National Security Adviser.) The previously unreported meeting, which
was confirmed in the AP this morning by National Security Counsel
spokesman Frederick Jones, occurred at "a critical moment in the White
House campaign to convince Congress and the American public that war in
Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam Hussein from developing nuclear
weapons." A month later, "forged documents were cabled from the U.S.
embassy in Rome to Washington after being delivered to embassy
officials" by an Italian reporter.

CLASSIC NON-DENIAL DENIAL: National Security Counsel spokesman Fredrick
Jones said that during the Hadley-Pollari meeting, "the subject of
Iraq's supposed uranium deal with Niger is not believed to have come
up." Jones described the meeting as "a courtesy call that lasted fewer
than 15 minutes." He added, "no one present has any recollection of
yellowcake being discussed."

HADLEY IGNORED REPEATED WARNING THAT THE INTELLIGENCE WAS FLAWED: Prior
to the 2003 State of the Union, Hadley was warned three separate times
by the CIA not to push the claim that Iraq sought to purchase uranium
from Niger. On October 5, Hadley and speechwriter Michael Gerson
received a memo from the CIA noting "that CIA had told the Congress
about concerns about the British claim." Another CIA memo sent to
Hadley the next day warned that the Africa uranium story "was one of
two issues where we differed with the British intelligence." The
written warning was accompanied by a phone call from then-CIA Director
George Tenet requesting "that any reference to Iraq's attempt to
purchase uranium from sources from Africa to be deleted" from a speech
the president gave in Cincinnati in October. On July 22, 2003, Hadley
confessed "the fact is that given the October 5 and 6 CIA memorandum,
and my telephone conversation with the DCI Tenet at roughly the same
time, I should have recalled at the time of the State of the Union
speech that there was controversy associated with the uranium issue."

HADLEY DEEPLY INVOLVED IN LEAK SCANDAL: Laura Rozen writes in the
American Prospect, "Hadley's meeting with Pollari, at precisely the
time when the Niger forgeries came into the possession of the U.S.
government, may explain the seemingly hysterical White House
overreaction to Wilson's article almost a year later." Hadley played an
integral part in that overreaction. After Karl Rove discussed Valerie
Plame's covert identity with Time reporter Matt Cooper, he emailed
Hadley: "When he finished his brief heads-up he immediately launched
into Niger. Isn't this damaging? Hasn't the president been hurt? I
didn't take the bait..." Hadley also headed up the administration
effort to pin the blame on the CIA. The Washington Post reported,
"Behind the scenes, the White House responded with twin attacks: one on
Wilson and the other on the CIA, which it wanted to take the blame for
allowing the 16 words to remain in Bush's speech. As part of this
effort, then-deputy national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley spoke
with Tenet during the week about clearing up CIA responsibility for the
16 words, even though both knew the agency did not think Iraq was
seeking uranium from Niger, according to a person familiar with the
conversation." (For more details on administration involvement in the
leak scandal see our cast of characters).

THE WEB ADMINISTRATION CONNECTIONS: The AP also reports that "Pollari
used his own contacts in the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans...to
promote the dossier" of forged documents. Pollari had very good
connections with the Office of Special Plans, which was run by Douglas
Feith. (Gen. Tommy Franks calls Feith "the [expletive] stupidest guy on
the face of the earth.") In 2001, Polari attended secret meeting with
three employees of the Office of Special Plans, Harold Rhode, Michael
Ledeen and Larry Franklin. (Franklin has subsequently "pled guilty to
passing information about U.S. policy towards Iran to Israel through
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).") The purpose of
the meetings, which violated protocol because the CIA was in
attendance, was to set up direct contact between the Pentagon and
Iranian dissidents. One Iranian in attendance was "arms dealer Manucher
Ghorbanifar." The CIA "believes Ghorbanifar is a serial 'fabricator'
and forbids its officers from having anything to do with him."