http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...lndzv.asp?pg=1

Here's the text:



The Connection
From the June 7, 2004 issue: The collaboration of Iraq and al Qaeda.
by Stephen F. Hayes
06/07/2004, Volume 009, Issue 37


THE PRESIDENT CONVINCED the country with a mixture of documents that turned
out to be forged and blatantly false assertions that Saddam was in league
with al Qaeda," claimed former Vice President Al Gore last Wednesday.
"There's absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda, ever,"
declared Richard Clarke, former counterterrorism official under George W.
Bush and Bill Clinton, in an interview on March 21, 2004.

The editor of the Los Angeles Times labeled as "myth" the claim that links
between Iraq and al Qaeda had been proved. A recent dispatch from Reuters
simply asserted, "There is no link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda." 60
Minutes anchor Lesley Stahl was equally certain: "There was no connection."

And on it goes. This conventional wisdom--that our two most determined
enemies were not in league, now or ever--is comforting. It is also wrong.

In late February 2004, Christopher Carney made an astonishing discovery.
Carney, a political science professor from Pennsylvania on leave to work at
the Pentagon, was poring over a list of officers in Saddam Hussein's
much-feared security force, the Fedayeen Saddam. One name stood out:
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. The name was not spelled exactly as
Carney had seen it before, but such discrepancies are common. Having studied
the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda for 18 months, he immediately
recognized the potential significance of his find. According to a report
last
week in the Wall Street Journal, Shakir appears on three different lists of
Fedayeen officers.

An Iraqi of that name, Carney knew, had been present at an al Qaeda summit
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on January 5-8, 2000. U.S. intelligence officials
believe this was a chief planning meeting for the September 11 attacks.
Shakir had been nominally employed as a "greeter" by Malaysian Airlines, a
job he told associates he had gotten through a contact at the Iraqi embassy.
More curious, Shakir's Iraqi embassy contact controlled his schedule,
telling him when to show up for work and when to take a day off.

A greeter typically meets VIPs upon arrival and accompanies them through the
sometimes onerous procedures of foreign travel. Shakir was instructed to
work on January 5, 2000, and on that day, he escorted one Khalid al Mihdhar
from his plane to a waiting car. Rather than bid his guest farewell at that
point, as a greeter typically would have, Shakir climbed into the car with
al Mihdhar and accompanied him to the Kuala Lumpur condominium of Yazid
Sufaat, the American-born al Qaeda terrorist who hosted the planning
meeting.

The meeting lasted for three days. Khalid al Mihdhar departed Kuala Lumpur
for Bangkok and eventually Los Angeles. Twenty months later, he was aboard
American Airlines Flight 77 when it plunged into the Pentagon at 9:38 A.M.
on September 11. So were Nawaf al Hazmi and his younger brother, Salem, both
of whom were also present at the Kuala Lumpur meeting.

Six days after September 11, Shakir was captured in Doha, Qatar. He had in
his possession contact information for several senior al Qaeda terrorists:
Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, brother of September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed; Musab Yasin, brother of Abdul Rahman Yasin, the Iraqi who helped
mix the chemicals for the first World Trade Center attack and was given safe
haven upon his return to Baghdad; and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, otherwise known
as Abu Hajer al Iraqi, described by one top al Qaeda detainee as Osama bin
Laden's "best friend."


Despite all of this, Shakir was released. On October 21, 2001, he boarded a
plane for Baghdad, via Amman, Jordan. He never made the connection. Shakir
was detained by Jordanian intelligence. Immediately following his capture,
according to U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence on Shakir, the
Iraqi government began exerting pressure on the Jordanians to release him.
Some U.S. intelligence officials--primarily at the CIA--believed that Iraq's
demand for Shakir's release was pro forma, no different from the requests
governments regularly make on behalf of citizens detained by foreign
nationals. But others, pointing to the flurry of phone calls and personal
appeals from the Iraqi government to the Jordanians, disagreed. This
panicked reaction, they say, reflected an interest in Shakir at the highest
levels of Saddam Hussein's regime.

CIA officials who interviewed Shakir in Jordan reported that he was
generally uncooperative. But even in refusing to talk, he provided some
important information: The interrogators concluded that his evasive answers
reflected counterinterrogation techniques so sophisticated
that he had probably learned them from a government intelligence service.
Shakir's nationality, his contacts with the Iraqi embassy in Malaysia, the
keen interest of Baghdad in his case, and now the appearance of his name on
the rolls of Fedayeen officers--all this makes the Iraqi intelligence
service the most likely source of his training.

The Jordanians, convinced that Shakir worked for Iraqi intelligence, went to
the CIA with a bold proposal: Let's flip him. That is, the Jordanians would
allow Shakir to return to Iraq on the condition that he agree to report back
on the activities of Iraqi intelligence. And, in one of the most egregious
mistakes by the U.S. intelligence community after September 11, the CIA
agreed to Shakir's release. He posted a modest bail and returned to Iraq.

He hasn't been heard from since.

The Shakir story is perhaps the government's strongest indication that
Saddam and al Qaeda may have worked together on September 11. But it is far
from conclusive; conceivably there were two Ahmed Hikmat Shakirs. And in
itself, the evidence does not show that Saddam Hussein personally had
foreknowledge of the attacks. Still--like the long, on-again-off-again
relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda--it cannot be dismissed.


THERE WAS A TIME not long ago when the conventional wisdom skewed heavily
toward a Saddam-al Qaeda collaboration. In 1998 and early 1999, the Iraq-al
Qaeda connection was widely reported in the American and international
media. Former intelligence officers and government officials speculated
about the relationship and its dangerous implications for the world. The
information in the news reports came from foreign and domestic intelligence
services. It was featured in mainstream media outlets including
international wire services, prominent newsweeklies, network radio and
television broadcasts.

Newsweek magazine ran an article in its January 11, 1999, issue headed
"Saddam + Bin Laden?" "Here's what is known so far," it read:


Saddam Hussein, who has a long record of supporting terrorism, is trying
to rebuild his intelligence network overseas--assets that would allow him to
establish a terrorism network. U.S. sources say he is reaching out to
Islamic terrorists, including some who may be linked to Osama bin Laden, the
wealthy Saudi exile accused of masterminding the bombing of two U.S.
embassies in Africa last summer.

Four days later, on January 15, 1999, ABC News reported that three
intelligence agencies believed that Saddam had offered asylum to bin Laden.


Intelligence sources say bin Laden's long relationship with the Iraqis
began as he helped Sudan's fundamentalist government in their efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. . . . ABC News has learned that in
December, an Iraqi intelligence chief named Faruq Hijazi, now Iraq's
ambassador to Turkey, made a secret trip to Afghanistan to meet with bin
Laden. Three intelligence agencies tell ABC News they cannot be certain what
was discussed, but almost certainly, they say, bin Laden has been told he
would be welcome in Baghdad.

NPR reporter Mike Shuster interviewed Vincent Cannistraro, former head of
the CIA's counterterrorism center, and offered this report.


Iraq's contacts with bin Laden go back some years, to at least 1994, when,
according to one U.S. government source, Hijazi met him when bin Laden lived
in Sudan. According to Cannistraro, Iraq invited bin Laden to live in
Baghdad to be nearer to potential targets of terrorist attack in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. . . . Some experts believe bin Laden might be tempted to
live in Iraq because of his reported desire to obtain chemical or biological
weapons. CIA Director George Tenet referred to that in recent testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee when he said bin Laden was
planning additional attacks on American targets.

By mid-February 1999, journalists did not even feel the need to qualify
these claims of an Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. An Associated Press dispatch
that ran in the Washington Post ended this way: "The Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against
Western powers."

Where did journalists get the idea that Saddam and bin Laden might be
coordinating efforts? Among other places, from high-ranking Clinton
administration officials.

In the spring of 1998--well before the U.S. embassy bombings in East
Africa--the Clinton administration indicted Osama bin Laden. The indictment,
unsealed a few months later, prominently cited al Qaeda's agreement to
collaborate with Iraq on weapons of mass destruction. The Clinton Justice
Department had been concerned about negative public reaction to its
potentially capturing bin Laden without "a vehicle for extradition,"
official paperwork charging him with a crime. It was "not an afterthought"
to include the al Qaeda-Iraq connection in the indictment, says an official
familiar with the deliberations. "It couldn't have gotten into the
indictment unless someone was willing to testify to it under oath." The
Clinton administration's indictment read unequivocally:


Al Qaeda reached an understanding with the government of Iraq that al
Qaeda would not work against that government and that on particular
projects, specifically including weapons development, al Qaeda would work
cooperatively with the Government of Iraq.

On August 7, 1998, al Qaeda terrorists struck almost simultaneously at U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The blasts killed 257 people--including 12
Americans--and wounded nearly 5,000. The Clinton administration determined
within five days that al Qaeda was responsible for the attacks and moved
swiftly to retaliate. One of the targets would be in Afghanistan. But the
Clinton national security team wanted to strike hard simultaneously, much as
the terrorists had. "The decision to go to [Sudan] was an add-on," says a
senior intelligence officer involved in the targeting. "They wanted a dual
strike."

A small group of Clinton administration officials, led by CIA director
George Tenet and national security adviser Sandy Berger, reviewed a number
of al Qaeda-linked targets in Sudan. Although bin Laden had left the African
nation two years earlier, U.S. officials believed that he was still deeply
involved in the Sudanese government-run Military Industrial Corporation
(MIC).

The United States retaliated on August 20, 1998, striking al Qaeda training
camps in Afghanistan and the al Shifa pharmaceutical plant outside Khartoum.
"Let me be very clear about this," said President Bill Clinton, addressing
the nation after the strikes. "There is no question in my mind that the
Sudanese factory was producing chemicals that are used--and can be used--in
VX gas. This was a plant that was producing chemical warfare-related weapons
and we have physical evidence of that."

The physical evidence was a soil sample containing EMPTA, a precursor for VX
nerve gas. Almost immediately, the decision to strike at al Shifa aroused
controversy. U.S. officials had expressed skepticism that the plant produced
pharmaceuticals at all, but reporters on the ground in Sudan found aspirin
bottles and a variety of other indications that the plant had, in fact,
manufactured drugs. For journalists and many at the CIA, the case was hardly
clear cut. For one thing, the soil sample was collected from outside the
plant's front gate, not within the grounds, and an internal CIA memo issued
a month before the attacks had recommended gathering additional soil samples
from the site before reaching any conclusions. "It caused a lot of heartburn
at the agency," recalls a former top intelligence official.

The Clinton administration sought to dispel doubts about the targeting and,
on August 24, 1998, made available a "senior intelligence official" to brief
reporters on background. The briefer cited "strong ties between the plant
and Iraq" as one of the justifications for attacking it. The next day,
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering briefed
reporters at the National Press Club. Pickering explained that the
intelligence community had been monitoring the plant for "at least two
years," and that the evidence was "quite clear on contacts between Sudan and
Iraq." In all, at least six top Clinton administration officials have
defended on the record the strikes in Sudan by citing a link to Iraq.

The Iraqis, of course, denied any involvement. "The Clinton government has
fabricated yet another lie to the effect that Iraq had helped Sudan produce
this chemical weapon," declared the political editor of Radio Iraq. Still,
even as Iraq denied helping Sudan and al Qaeda with weapons of mass
destruction, the regime lauded Osama bin Laden. On August 27, 1998, twenty
days after al Qaeda attacked the U.S. embassies in Africa, Babel, the
government newspaper run by Saddam's son Uday Hussein, published a startling
editorial proclaiming bin Laden "an Arab and Islamic hero."

Five months later, the same Richard Clarke who would one day claim that
there was "absolutely no evidence that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda, ever,"
told the Washington Post that the U.S. government was "sure" that Iraq was
behind the production of the chemical weapons precursor at the al Shifa
plant. "Clarke said U.S. intelligence does not know how much of the
substance was produced at al Shifa or what happened to it," wrote Post
reporter Vernon Loeb, in an article published January 23, 1999. "But he said
that intelligence exists linking bin Laden to al Shifa's current and past
operators, the Iraqi nerve gas experts, and the National Islamic Front in
Sudan."

Later in 1999, the Congressional Research Service published a report on the
psychology of terrorism. That report created a stir in May 2002 when critics
of President Bush cited it to suggest that his administration should have
given more thought to suicide hijackings. On page 7 of the 178-page report
was a passage about a possible al Qaeda attack on Washington, D.C., that
"could take several forms." In one scenario, the report suggested "suicide
bombers belonging to al Qaeda's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an
aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the
headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the White House."

A network anchor wondered if it was possible that the White House had
somehow missed the report. A senator cited it in calling for an
investigation into the 9/11 attacks. A journalist read excerpts to the
secretary of defense and raised a familiar question: "What did you know and
when did you know it?"

But another passage of the same report has gone strangely unnoticed. Two
paragraphs before, also on page 7, is this: "If Iraq's Saddam Hussein
decide[s] to use terrorists to attack the continental United States [he]
would likely turn to bin Laden's al Qaeda. Al Qaeda is among the Islamic
groups recruiting increasingly skilled professionals," including "Iraqi
chemical weapons experts and others capable of helping to develop WMD. Al
Qaeda poses the most serious terrorist threat to U.S. security interests,
for al Qaeda's well-trained terrorists are engaged in a terrorist jihad
against U.S. interests worldwide."

CIA director George Tenet echoed these sentiments in a letter to Congress on
October 7, 2002.


-- Our understanding of the relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda is
evolving and is based on sources of varying reliability. Some of the
information we have received comes from detainees, including some of high
rank.

--We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and Al
Qaeda going back a decade.

--Credible information indicates that Iraq and Al Qaeda have discussed
safe haven and reciprocal nonaggression.

--Since Operation Enduring Freedom, we have solid evidence of the presence
in Iraq of Al Qaeda members, including some that have been in Baghdad.

--We have credible reporting that Al Qaeda leaders sought contacts in Iraq
who could help them acquire W.M.D. capabilities. The reporting also stated
that Iraq has provided training to Al Qaeda members in the areas of poisons
and gases and making conventional bombs.

--Iraq's increasing support to extremist Palestinians coupled with growing
indications of relationship with Al Qaeda suggest that Baghdad's links to
terrorists will increase, even absent U.S. military action.



Tenet has never backed away from these assessments. Senator Mark Dayton, a
Democrat from Minnesota, challenged him on the Iraq-al Qaeda connection in
an exchange before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 9, 2004.
Tenet reiterated his judgment that there had been numerous "contacts"
between Iraq and al Qaeda, and that in the days before the war the Iraqi
regime had provided "training and safe haven" to al Qaeda associates,
including Abu Musab al Zarqawi. What the U.S. intelligence community could
not claim was that the Iraqi regime had "command and control" over al Qaeda
terrorists. Still, said Tenet, "it was inconceivable to me that Zarqawi and
two dozen [Egyptian Islamic Jihad] operatives could be operating in Baghdad
without Iraq knowing."


SO WHAT should Washington do now? The first thing the Bush administration
should do is create a team of intelligence experts--or preferably, competing
teams, each composed of terrorism experts and forensic investigators--to
explore the connection between Iraq and al Qaeda. For more than a year, the
1,400-member Iraq Survey Group has investigated the nature and scope of
Iraq's program to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. At various times
in its brief history, a small subgroup of ISG investigators (never more than
15 people) has looked into Iraqi connections with al Qaeda. This is not
enough.

Despite the lack of resources devoted to Iraq-al Qaeda connections, the Iraq
Survey Group has obtained some interesting new information. In the spring of
1992, according to Iraqi Intelligence documents obtained by the ISG after
the war, Osama bin Laden met with Iraqi Intelligence officials in Syria. A
second document, this one captured by the Iraqi National Congress and
authenticated by the Defense Intelligence Agency, then listed bin Laden as
an Iraqi Intelligence "asset" who "is in good relationship with our section
in Syria." A third Iraqi Intelligence document, this one an undated internal
memo, discusses strategy for an upcoming meeting between Iraqi Intelligence,
bin Laden, and a representative of the Taliban. On the agenda: "attacking
American targets." This seems significant.

A second critical step would be to declassify as much of the Iraq-al Qaeda
intelligence as possible. Those skeptical of any connection claim that any
evidence of a relationship must have been "cherry picked" from much larger
piles of existing intelligence that makes these Iraq-al Qaeda links less
compelling. Let's see it all, or as much of it as can be disclosed without
compromising sources and methods.

Among the most important items to be declassified: the Iraq Survey Group
documents discussed above; any and all reporting and
documentation--including photographs--pertaining to Ahmed Hikmat Shakir, the
Iraqi and alleged Saddam Fedayeen officer present at the September 11
planning meeting; interview transcripts with top Iraqi intelligence
officers, al Qaeda terrorists, and leaders of al Qaeda affiliate Ansar al
Islam; documents recovered in postwar Iraq indicating that Abdul Rahman
Yasin, the Iraqi who has admitted mixing the chemicals for the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing, was given safe haven and financial support by the
Iraqi regime upon returning to Baghdad two weeks after the attack; any and
all reporting and documentation--including photographs--related to Mohammed
Atta's visits to Prague; portions of the debriefings of Faruq Hijazi, former
deputy director of Iraqi intelligence, who met personally with bin Laden at
least twice, and an evaluation of his credibility.

It is of course important for the Bush administration and CIA director
George Tenet to back up their assertions of an Iraq-al Qaeda connection.
Similarly, declassifying intelligence from the 1990s might shed light on why
top Clinton officials were adamant about an Iraq-al Qaeda connection in the
Sudan and why the Clinton Justice Department included the Iraq-al Qaeda
relationship in its 1998 indictment of Osama bin Laden. More specifically,
what intelligence did Richard Clarke see that allowed him to tell the
Washington Post that the U.S. government was "sure" Iraq had provided a
chemical weapons precursor to the al Qaeda-linked al Shifa facility in
Sudan? What would compel former secretary of defense William Cohen to tell
the September 11 Commission, under oath, that an executive from the al
Qaeda-linked plant "traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX
[nerve gas] program"? And why did Thomas Pickering, the undersecretary of
state for political affairs, tell reporters, "We see evidence that we think
is quite clear on contacts between Sudan and Iraq. In fact, al Shifa
officials, early in the company's history, we believe were in touch with
Iraqi individuals associated with Iraq's VX program"? Other Clinton
administration figures, including a "senior intelligence official" who
briefed reporters on background, cited telephone intercepts between a plant
manager and Emad al Ani, the father of Iraq's chemical weapons program.

We have seen important elements of the pre-September 11 intelligence
available to the Bush administration; it's time for the American public to
see more of the intelligence on Iraq and al Qaeda from the 1990s, especially
the reporting about the August 1998 attacks in Kenya and Tanzania and the
U.S. counterstrikes two weeks later.

Until this material is declassified, there will be gaps in our knowledge.
Indeed, even after the full record is made public, some uncertainties will
no doubt remain.

The connection between Saddam and al Qaeda isn't one of them.

NOYB wrote:
THE PRESIDENT CONVINCED the country with a mixture of documents that turned
out to be forged and blatantly false

A long meandering tale, hinging on *one* individual, full of "might be"
and "maybe", is sufficient reason to wage a war, occupy a country, kill
10,000 Iraqi civilians and 1,000 U.S. soldiers?

Don't think so.

DSK

On Fri, 28 May 2004 22:35:22 -0400, NOYB wrote:

http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...lndzv.asp?pg=1

Maybe, maybe not.

http://www.spinsanity.org/post.html?...3_archive.html

thunder wrote:
On Fri, 28 May 2004 22:35:22 -0400, NOYB wrote:


http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...lndzv.asp?pg=1


Maybe, maybe not.

http://www.spinsanity.org/post.html?...3_archive.html


You fellows must be unfamiliar with the Weekly Standard, which is
nothing more than a high-toned, right-wing cheerleading publication for
the Republicans and George W. Bush.

In article ,
says...
NOYB wrote:
THE PRESIDENT CONVINCED the country with a mixture of documents that turned
out to be forged and blatantly false

A long meandering tale, hinging on *one* individual, full of "might be"
and "maybe", is sufficient reason to wage a war, occupy a country, kill
10,000 Iraqi civilians and 1,000 U.S. soldiers?

Don't think so.

DSK

Grasping at straws. Balsa wood drones, Winnebago weapons labs, a single
sarin gas shell, a single scum bag who maybe played both sides.

Any one of the above justifies our imperial ambitions for the fans of
George.

jps

"DSK" wrote in message
.. .
NOYB wrote:
THE PRESIDENT CONVINCED the country with a mixture of documents that
turned
out to be forged and blatantly false

A long meandering tale, hinging on *one* individual, full of "might be"
and "maybe", is sufficient reason to wage a war, occupy a country, kill
10,000 Iraqi civilians and 1,000 U.S. soldiers?

Don't think so.

You conveniently dismissed the NPR, ABC News, and Newsweek reports from 1998
and 1999 that stated Saddam was working with bin Laden and actually
discussed offering him sanctuary.

Where are the reporters who wrote those stories back then? What are they
saying now that it's not Clinton who's sitting in the Oval Office?

"thunder" wrote in message
news
On Fri, 28 May 2004 22:35:22 -0400, NOYB wrote:


http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...lndzv.asp?pg=1

Maybe, maybe not.

http://www.spinsanity.org/post.html?...3_archive.html


....on January 15, 1999, ABC News reported that three
intelligence agencies believed that Saddam had offered asylum to bin Laden.


Intelligence sources say bin Laden's long relationship with the Iraqis
began as he helped Sudan's fundamentalist government in their efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. . . . ABC News has learned that in
December, an Iraqi intelligence chief named Faruq Hijazi, now Iraq's
ambassador to Turkey, made a secret trip to Afghanistan to meet with bin
Laden. Three intelligence agencies tell ABC News they cannot be certain what
was discussed, but almost certainly, they say, bin Laden has been told he
would be welcome in Baghdad.

NPR reporter Mike Shuster interviewed Vincent Cannistraro, former head of
the CIA's counterterrorism center, and offered this report.


Iraq's contacts with bin Laden go back some years, to at least 1994, when,
according to one U.S. government source, Hijazi met him when bin Laden lived
in Sudan. According to Cannistraro, Iraq invited bin Laden to live in
Baghdad to be nearer to potential targets of terrorist attack in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. . . . Some experts believe bin Laden might be tempted to
live in Iraq because of his reported desire to obtain chemical or biological
weapons. CIA Director George Tenet referred to that in recent testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee when he said bin Laden was
planning additional attacks on American targets.

By mid-February 1999, journalists did not even feel the need to qualify
these claims of an Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. An Associated Press dispatch
that ran in the Washington Post ended this way: "The Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against
Western powers."

--------------------------------------------------------

See, DSK? No mention of Shakir in this part that you snipped.

"jps" wrote in message
...
In article ,
says...
NOYB wrote:
THE PRESIDENT CONVINCED the country with a mixture of documents that
turned
out to be forged and blatantly false

A long meandering tale, hinging on *one* individual, full of "might be"
and "maybe", is sufficient reason to wage a war, occupy a country, kill
10,000 Iraqi civilians and 1,000 U.S. soldiers?

Don't think so.

DSK

Grasping at straws. Balsa wood drones, Winnebago weapons labs, a single
sarin gas shell, a single scum bag who maybe played both sides.

Any one of the above justifies our imperial ambitions for the fans of
George.

jps


How do you account for the 1999 NPR, ABC News, Washington Post, and Newsweek
stories that concluded:
"The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who
openly supports Iraq against Western powers"?

"Harry Krause" wrote in message
...
thunder wrote:
On Fri, 28 May 2004 22:35:22 -0400, NOYB wrote:



http://www.weeklystandard.com/Conten...0/004/152lndzv
..asp?pg=1


Maybe, maybe not.

http://www.spinsanity.org/post.html?...3_archive.html


You fellows must be unfamiliar with the Weekly Standard,

How about NPR, the Washington Post, ABC News, and Newsweek?

Four days later, on January 15, 1999, ABC News reported that three
intelligence agencies believed that Saddam had offered asylum to bin Laden.


Intelligence sources say bin Laden's long relationship with the Iraqis
began as he helped Sudan's fundamentalist government in their efforts to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. . . . ABC News has learned that in
December, an Iraqi intelligence chief named Faruq Hijazi, now Iraq's
ambassador to Turkey, made a secret trip to Afghanistan to meet with bin
Laden. Three intelligence agencies tell ABC News they cannot be certain what
was discussed, but almost certainly, they say, bin Laden has been told he
would be welcome in Baghdad.

NPR reporter Mike Shuster interviewed Vincent Cannistraro, former head of
the CIA's counterterrorism center, and offered this report.


Iraq's contacts with bin Laden go back some years, to at least 1994, when,
according to one U.S. government source, Hijazi met him when bin Laden lived
in Sudan. According to Cannistraro, Iraq invited bin Laden to live in
Baghdad to be nearer to potential targets of terrorist attack in Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait. . . . Some experts believe bin Laden might be tempted to
live in Iraq because of his reported desire to obtain chemical or biological
weapons. CIA Director George Tenet referred to that in recent testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee when he said bin Laden was
planning additional attacks on American targets.

By mid-February 1999, journalists did not even feel the need to qualify
these claims of an Iraq-al Qaeda relationship. An Associated Press dispatch
that ran in the Washington Post ended this way: "The Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein has offered asylum to bin Laden, who openly supports Iraq against
Western powers."