On Sun, 13 Dec 2009 08:03:53 -0500, Tom Francis - SWSports
wrote:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...ryId=121330893
Here's one I got in an email:
New York Times
December 8, 2009
Pg. 37
The Next Surge: Counterbureaucracy
By Jonathan J. Vaccaro
The Taliban commander was back in the village. Our base roared to life
as we prepared to capture him. Two Chinook helicopters spun their
blades
in anticipation in the dark. Fifty Afghan commandos brooded outside,
pacing in the gravel. I was nearby, yelling into a phone: "Who else do
we need approvals from? Another colonel? Why?"
A villager had come in that afternoon to tell us that a Taliban
commander known for his deployment of suicide bombers was threatening
the elders. The villager had come to my unit, a detachment of the
United
States Army stationed in eastern Afghanistan, for help.
Mindful of orders to protect the civilian population, we developed a
plan with the Afghan commandos to arrest the Taliban commander that
evening before he moved back into Pakistan. While the troops prepared,
I
spent hours on the phone trying to convince the 11 separate Afghan,
American and international forces authorities who needed to sign off
to
agree on a plan.
Some couldn't be found. Some liked the idea, others suggested
revisions.
The plan evolved. Hours passed. The cellphone in the corner rang.
"Where
are you?" the villager asked urgently. The Taliban commander was
drinking tea, he said.
At 5 a.m. the Afghan commandos gave up on us and went home. The
helicopters powered down. The sun rose. I was still on the phone
trying
to arrange approvals. Intelligence arrived indicating that the Taliban
commander had moved on. The villagers were incredulous.
This incident is typical of what I saw during my six-month tour in
Afghanistan this year. We were paralyzed by red tape, beaten by our
own
team. Our answer to Afghans seeking help was: "I can't come today or
tomorrow, but maybe next week. I have several bosses that I need to
ask
for permission."
The decision has been made to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan,
and Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander there, is
expected to speak to Congress this week about his strategy for the
war.
Our troops can win the war, but they will be more effective if the
bureaucracy is thinned.
In my experience, decisions move through the process of risk
mitigation
like molasses. When the Taliban arrive in a village, I discovered, it
takes 96 hours for an Army commander to obtain necessary approvals to
act. In the first half of 2009, the Army Special Forces company I was
with repeatedly tried to interdict Taliban. By our informal count,
however, we (and the Afghan commandos we worked with) were stopped on
70
percent of our attempts because we could not achieve the requisite 11
approvals in time.
For some units, ground movement to dislodge the Taliban requires a
colonel's oversight. In eastern Afghanistan, traveling in anything
other
than a 20-ton mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle requires a
written
justification, a risk assessment and approval from a colonel, a
lieutenant colonel and sometimes a major. These vehicles are so large
that they can drive to fewer than half the villages in Afghanistan.
They
sink into wet roads, crush dry ones and require wide berth on mountain
roads intended for donkeys. The Taliban walk to these villages or
drive
pickup trucks.
The red tape isn't just on the battlefield. Combat commanders are
required to submit reports in PowerPoint with proper fonts, line
widths
and colors so that the filing system is not derailed. Small aid
projects
lag because of multimonth authorization procedures. A United
States-financed health clinic in Khost Province was built last year,
but
its opening was delayed for more than eight months while paperwork for
erecting its protective fence waited in the approval queue.
Communication with the population also undergoes thorough oversight.
When a suicide bomber detonates, the Afghan streets are abuzz with
Taliban propaganda about the glories of the war against America.
Meanwhile, our messages have to inch through a press release approval
pipeline, emerging 24 to 48 hours after the event, like a debutante
too
late for the ball.
Curbing the bureaucracy is possible. Decision-making authority for
operations could be returned to battalions and brigades. Staffs that
manage the flow of operations could operate on 24-hour schedules like
the forces they regulate. Authority to release information could be
delegated to units in contact with Afghans. Formatting requirements
could be eased. The culture of risk mitigation could be countered with
a
culture of initiative.
Mid-level leaders win or lose conflicts. Our forces are better than
the
Taliban's, but we have leashed them so tightly that they are unable to
compete.
Jonathan J. Vaccaro served as an officer with the United States Army
in
Afghanistan from January 2009 to July 2009.
--
John H