Cape Cod, May 12th 2007


This is the log of actions and events driven by the only-subsequently
named Sub-tropical Storm Andrea, leading to the sinking of s/v Sean
Seamour II and the successful rescue of its entire crew on the early
morning of May 7th 2007.

We departed from Green Cove Springs on the Saint Johns River in the
early morning of May 2nd, 2007. Gibraltar was our prime destination with
a planned stopover in the Azores for recommissioning and eventually
fuel. The vessel, on its second crossing was fully prepared and some of
the recent preparations done by Holland Marine and skipper with crew
were as follows:

• Full rig check, navigation lights, new wind sensor, sheet and line
check / replacement
• New autopilot, stuffing box and shaft seal, house battery bank, racor
fuel filtering system
• Bottom paint, new rudder bearing and check, new auxiliary tiller, full
engine maintenance
• Recertification of life raft and check of GPIRB (good to November
2007), update and replacement of all security equipment (PFDs, flares,
medical, etc).

Although paper charts were available for all planned destinations, with
increased dependence on electronic navigational aids, two computers were
programmed to handle both the MaxSea navigation software (version 12.5)
as well as the Iridium satphone for weather data (MaxSea Chopper and
OCENS). A full electronic systems checkout and burn trial was done
during the days prior to departure.

For heavy weather and collision contingencies cutter rigged Sean Seamour
II was equipped with two drogues (heavy and light), collision mat,
auxiliary electric pump, as well as extensive power tools to enable
repairs at sea with the 2.4kva inverter. Operational process and use of
this equipment was discussed at length with the crew in anticipation.
Other physical process contingencies such as lashing, closing seacocks,
companionway doors, etc. were equally treated.

The 7 day weather GRIBs downloaded almost daily from April 25th onwards
showed no inconsistencies, with the two high and two low pressure
systems fairly balanced over the western Atlantic. Only the proximity of
the two low pressure systems seemed to warrant surveillance as the May
5th GRIB would indicate with a flow increase from the N,NO from 20 to 35
knots focused towards coastal waters.

Already on a northerly course some 200 nautical miles out, I maintained
our navigational plan with a N,NE heading until increased winds
warranted a more easterly tack planned approximately 300 nautical miles
north of Bermuda towards the Azores.

Wind force increased about eight hours earlier than expected and later
shifted to the NE reaching well into the 60 knots range by early
afternoon, then well beyond as the winds shifted. Considering that we
were confronted with a sustained weather system that was quite different
from the gulf stream squall lines we had weathered previous days, by mid
afternoon I decided to take appropriate protective measures.

From our last known position approximately 217 nautical miles east of
Cape Hatteras I reversed course, laying my largest drogue off the
starboard stern while maintaining a quarter of the storm jib on the
inner roller furl. This was designed to balance the boat's natural
windage due in large part to its hard dodger and center cockpit structure.

By late afternoon the winds were sustained at well over 70 knots and
seas were building fast. I estimate seas were well into 25 feet by dusk
but after adding approximately 150 feet of drogue line the vessel
handled smoothly over the next eight hours advancing with the seas at
about 6 knots (SOG). By late evening the winds were sustained above 74
kts and a crew member recorded a peak of 85.5 kts.

Growing and irregular seas were the primary concern as in the very early
hours of the morning the boat was increasingly struck by intermittant
waves to its port side. Crew had to be positioned against the starboard
side as both were tossed violently across the boat. Water began to
accumulate seemingly fed through the stern engine-room air cowls. I
believe in retrospect the goosenecks were insufficient with the pitch of
larger waves as they were breaking onto the stern.

At approximately 02.45 hours we were violently knocked all the way down
to starboard. It appears that the resulting angle and tension may have
caused the drogue line to rupture (clean cut), perhaps as it rubbed
against the same engine-room air-intake cowl positioned just below the
cleat. The line was attached to the port side main winch then fed
through the cleat where it was covered with anti-chaffing tape and
lubricant. Before abandoning ship I noticed the protected part of the
line was intact and extended beyond the cleat some five inches. Its
position in the cleat rather than retracted from it also supports this
theory.

After the knockdown I knew there was already structural damage and that
we had lost control of the vessel. I pulled the GPIRB (registered to
USCG documented Sean Seamour II) but I suspect that the old EPIRB from
1996 (Registered to USCG documented Lou Pantai, but kept as the vessel
was sold to an Italian national in 1998) might have been automatically
launched first. I kept this unit as a redundancy latched in its housing
on the port side of the hard dodger; it may have been ejected upon the
first knockdown as Coast Guard Authorities questioned relatives with
this vessel name versus Sean Seamour II. Herein lies a question that
needs to be answered, hopefully it will be in light of the USCG report.

The GPIRB initially functioned but the strobe stopped and the intensity
of the light diminished rapidly to the extent that I do not know if the
Coast Guard received that signal. At the time were worried the unit was
not emitting and I reinitiated the unit twice. The unit sent for
recertification with the life raft a few weeks prior had been returned
from River Services. They had responded to Holland Marine that the unit
was good until this coming November, functioned appropriately, and that
the battery had an extra five year life expectancy. I will await
reception of the Coast Guard report to find out if one or both signals
was processed as all POCs were questioned regarding Lou Pantai and not
my current vessel Sean Seamour II (both vessels had been / in the case
of Sean Seamour II is US Coast Guard documented).

Expecting worse to come I re-lashed and locked all openings and the
companionway. At 02:53hours we were struck violently again and began a
roll to 180 degrees. As the vessel appeared to stabilize in this
position I unlocked the companionway roof to exit an see where the life
raft was. It had disappeared from its poop deck cradle which I could
directly access as the helm and pedestal had been torn away. When I
emerged to the surface against the boat's starboard (in righted port
position) it began its second 180 degree roll. As it emerged the rig was
almost longitudinal to the boat barely missing the stern arch. Spreaders
were arrayed over cockpit and port side, mast cleanly bent at deck
level, forestays apparently torn away.

I ordered the crew to start all pumps. By their own volition they also
cut out 2.5 gallon water bottles to enable physical bailing while I
continued to locate the liferaft. It finally appeared upside down under
the rig. As its sea anchors and canopy lines were entangled in the rig
and partially torn by one of the spreaders I decided to cut them away in
an effort to save time and effort. I needed the crew below and had to
manage the rig entanglement alone. This done I managed to move the unit
forward and use its windward position to blow it over the bow to
starboard, attaching it still upside down.

Below, water was being stabilized above the knees. The new higher
positioned house battery bank was not shorted by the water level but the
engine bank was flooded not enabling us to start the engine and pump
from the bilge instead of the seacock. In retrospect this was not a loss
as having to keep one of the companionway doors off for bailing and to
route the Rule pump pipe, the water pouring in from here and the
through-deck mast hole were no match for the impeller' volume. Plugging
the mast passage was also not a solution as it was moving and hitting
violently against the starboard head wall and was dangerous to try to
cope with.

I knew the situation was desperate but it was still safer to stay aboard
than to abandon ship, let alone in the dark any earlier than necessary.
Estimating daylight at about 05:30 hours, we needed to hold on for at
least another two hours. As the boat shifted in the waves it became
increasingly vulnerable to flooding from breaking waves. One such wave
at about 05:20 added about 18 inches of water, as the bow was now barely
emerged these two factors triggered my decision to abandon ship. I
exited first knowing that the raft was still upside down. In addition,
some of the canopy lines still needed to be cut from the rig
entanglement. In the precipitation the grab bag containing Iridium
phone, VHF, GPS and all our personal and ship documents was lost.

As we boarded the now upturned raft it immediately flooded with the
breaking waves and once unprotected from the wind by the hull structure
was prone to turn over (no sea anchors nor canopy to roll over on).
Hypothermia was already gaining upon one of my crew and myself and our
efforts to right and re-enter the raft drained strength. Periods spent
lying on the overturned raft exposed to the wind seemed to further
weaken us.

Sean Seamour II sank a few minutes after we abandoned ship fully
disappearing from view after the second wave crest.

We became aware of fixed wing overflight sometime between 06:00 and
07:00 hours and estimate that the Coast Guard helicopter arrived some
time around 08:30 hours. As seemingly the most affected by hypothermia
and almost unconscious the crew had me lifted out first. It was a
perilous process during which Coast Guard AST2 Dazzo was himself injured
(later to be hospitalized with us). The liferaft was destroyed and
abandoned by AST2 Dazzo as the third crew member was extracted. He also
recouped the GPIRB which remained in USCG custody.

The emotions and admiration felt by my crew and myself to the dedication
of this Coast Guard team is immeasurable, all the more so when hearing
them comment on the severity and risk of the extraction, perhaps the
worst they had seen in ten years (dixit SAT2 Dazzo). They claim to have
measured 50 plus foot waves which from our perspective were mountains.
We measured after the first knockdown and before loosing our rig winds
still in excess of 72 knots.

Also to be commended are the medical teams involved, from our ambulatory
transfer of custody from the rescue team to the personnel awaiting us at
Cherry Point Naval Hospital. There the personnel under Director for
Administration CDR Robert S. Fry sought not only to address our physical
and medical trauma, but preempted the humanitarian crisis we were facing
after all this loss and anguish by bringing in the disaster relief
assistance of the American Red Cross to whom we owe the clothes, shelter
and food that helped us survive this ordeal.

JP de Lutz s/v Sean Seamour II