Skip,

Thank you very much for posting that.

One of the great safety resources of aviation was collective learning from
analysis of accidents. Boating could use more of it. In aviation however, we
seldom had to worry so much about the feelings of our friends during these
post mortems. Due to the nature of the activity they were more apt to be,
well, post mortems.

I know you have more than enough knowledge and character to translate
everything that has happened into experience. You don't need any help from
any of us with that. I've learned a lot from following this however and
discussion may help others as well as further increase the value of what
your hard lessons pass on to me. I'm planning on heading out next summer,
with a companion who has almost no experience, on the most extensive and
challenging sailing of my life. We're close to your age so I've really been
thinking about all this.

So, the rest of this is not addressed to you, Skip, but to myself and the
rest of us.

The lesson for me in these events is how a philosophy can interfere with
accomplishing critical tasks. Aviation invented the term CRM, Cockpit
Resource Management, when it learned that the culture and philosophy of the
Captain being an unquestioned authority was interfering with the crew's
ability avoid fatal mistakes. This looks like a CRM accident to me.

The underlying culture in this case was very different, almost the reverse,
of the captain as god, syndrome that created so many aviation accidents.
Still, an underlying culture and mindset obstructed proper navigation.

The captain in this case was being more his wife's husband than the master
of the vessel. The crew was more wife than watchstander. This may sound like
soft and fuzzy stuff but, when you get fatigued and stressed, the tendency
is to fall back on your underlying role. This is why pilots and others
engaged in hazardous activities practice so many drills, so that when
stressed, they will fall back on the drill instead of their normal selves.

When the watchstander get stressed here, she fell back in to the roll of
wife concerned with her husband's sleep. The husband may have wanted to rest
but the captain wanted his boat to remain afloat much more. I can see
similar dynamics in the husband's actions but there is no need to belabor
them.

All of us who have observed the all too common screaming docking evolutions
know that the roles can be take much too seriously. There's another side to
the coin, however. You have to look deeper than "just watch the chart
plotter and keep the little boat from going over the green places". The crew
of this vessel already knew that and everything else they needed to know to
complete this trip safely. You have to look for what obstructs that
knowledge and ability from getting translated into effective action.

This has also driven home something I've know but realize now that I've
observed more in talk than actual vessel management. Make fatigue part of
all your planning. The navigator's mental acuity is the most important
resource aboard. When evaluating your ability to transit a difficult area,
look forward to your likely condition, not your underlying ability. Could
you do it staggering drunk? If not, maybe it's not the appropriate ending
for a challenging leg.

I'm not preaching. I'll be sailing my own boat differently next summer as a
result of what I've learned from the "Flying Pig" grounding.

--

Roger Long