"Harry Krause" wrote in message
...
NOYB wrote:

"Harry Krause" wrote in message
...
NOYB wrote:

"Harry Krause" wrote in message
...
Backyard Renegade wrote:

Let me ask a question here. Is it at all possible that the
convoys
of
trucks tracked into Seria the last few weeks while the French,
Russians, and Germans held the majority of the member countries
back,
were the very carefully accounted for WMD moving to the Bekka
(sp?)
valley in Lebanon? Could we really know where they are

As to your question, certainly it is possible, but it is unlikely.
The
Israelis, who are far more sophisticated in these matters than we
are,
would have noticed.

Hehehe. You haven't been paying attention. The Israeli's *did*
notice.
Read:

Syria denies hiding Iraqi weapons
Sharon: Israel investigating reports
Wednesday, December 25, 2002 Posted: 3:13 PM EST (2013 GMT)



A bit naive about the Israelis, are we?

Me, naive? You said "the Israeli's would have noticed" convoys of large
trucks heading into Syria. I told you they already *did* notice...and I
provided a link from ONE YEAR AGO to prove it.

What's your spin now that you've been made to eat your words?



And the follow-up to a nothing report is?

I'm waiting.

Another indication you won't have to wait too long:



Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missile Development Programs

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International
Security
Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia
Washington, DC
September 16, 2003


Thank you, Madame Chairwoman and members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Syria's weapons of mass
destruction and missile development programs. I understand that we will have
a brief open hearing now and a closed session later today.

Syria remains a security concern on two important counts: terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction. I will focus on the latter, although the
potential linkages are obvious. Specifically, our Coalition's operations in
Iraq showed that this Administration and the international community take
the link between terrorism and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] most
seriously. There is no graver threat to our country today than states that
both sponsor terrorism and possess or aspire to possess weapons of mass
destruction. Syria, which offers physical sanctuary and political protection
to groups such as Hizballah, HAMAS, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and whose
terrorist operations have killed hundreds of innocent people - including
Americans -- falls into this category of states of potential dual threat.
While there is currently no information indicating that the Syrian
Government has transferred WMD to terrorist organizations or would permit
such groups to acquire them, Syria's ties to numerous terrorist groups
underlie the reasons for our continued anxiety.

Without question, among rogue states, those most aggressively seeking
to acquire or develop WMD and their means of delivery, and which are
therefore threats to our national security, are Iran and North Korea,
followed by Libya and Syria. It is also the case that these states are among
those we identify as state sponsors of terrorism. We aim not just to prevent
the spread of WMD, but also to "roll back" and ultimately eliminate such
weapons from the arsenals of rogue states and ensure that the terrorist
groups they sponsor do not acquire weapons of mass destruction. As President
Bush has said repeatedly, we will stress peaceful and diplomatic solutions
to the proliferation threat. However, in order to roll back proliferation
and protect innocent American citizens, as well as our friends and allies,
we must allow ourselves the option to use every tool in our nonproliferation
toolbox.

Obviously, many of you share these concerns. Members of this committee
have sponsored the Syria Accountability Act, which would impose restrictions
on the export of U.S. goods to Syria, as well as other measures. However, we
already possess a broad mandate to sanction countries like Syria for
proliferation activities under Executive Order 12938. This Executive Order,
promulgated in 1994, requires the imposition of sanctions against foreign
countries that have used chemical or biological weapons in violation of
international law or have developed, produced, stockpiled or otherwise
acquired chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law.
The Executive Order requires denial of foreign assistance; denial of credit
or financial assistance from U.S. Government agencies; U.S. opposition to
multilateral development bank assistance; denial of defense exports and
national security-sensitive exports; restrictions on imports into the U.S.;
and a termination of aircraft landing rights. Many of these same penalties
are duplicated in the proposed Syria Accountability Act.

Additionally, Section 4 of E.O. 12938, as amended in 1998, authorizes
penalties against entities that have "materially contributed or attempted to
contribute materially to the efforts of any foreign country, project, or
entity of proliferation concern to use, acquire, design, develop, produce,
or stockpile weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering
such weapons." Penalties can include a ban on imports into the U.S. of
goods, technology, or services produced by the sanctioned entity; a ban on
U.S. procurement from these entities; and a ban on U.S. assistance. In
addition, we have frequently augmented these penalties with a ban on defense
exports to the entity in question.

The standard for acts triggering these measures under the Executive
Order is very broad, and gives the decision-maker wide scope in punishing
entities that choose to engage in proliferant behavior. Just in this year,
we have imposed E.O. 12938 sanctions five times, including on the Chinese
entity, North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO), and the Iranian
entity, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group. This Administration views sanctions
as a useful tool for furthering our nonproliferation objectives and is
determined to enforce existing sanctions laws to the fullest extent. The
existing sanctions laws and the Executive Order, when properly applied, give
the Administration the authority and flexibility to use sanctions to deter
proliferation activity by rogue states and serial proliferators. Since I
began serving in my present position, I have insisted on using the mandatory
sanctions laws in the manner Congress intended.

Nonproliferation standards are all too often ignored and flagrantly
violated by governments that view WMD as a means of enhancing their security
and international influence. Many of these governments are resistant to
conventional diplomatic dialogue. While we pursue the diplomatic track
whenever possible, the United States and its allies must be willing to
deploy more robust techniques, such as economic sanctions, as well as
interdiction and seizure, or other means. The pursuit of WMD and ballistic
missile delivery systems, especially by state sponsors of terrorism, must be
neither cost free nor successful. Proliferators - and especially states
still deliberating whether to seek WMD -- must understand that they will pay
a steep price for their efforts. In short, if the language of persuasion
fails, these states must see and feel the logic of adverse consequences.
Moreover, adverse consequences must not only fall on the states aspiring to
possess these weapons, but also on the states supplying them.

In situations where we cannot convince a state to stop proliferant
behavior, we also have the option of interdicting shipments to ensure the
technology does not fall in to the wrong hands. These interdiction efforts
are key to a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy. Interdiction involves
identifying an imminent shipment or transfer and working to impede the
shipment. As the President noted in his National Strategy to Combat Weapons
of Mass Destruction, we must enhance the capabilities of our military,
intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the
movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and
terrorist organizations.

On May 31, President Bush announced the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), a global multilateral arrangement to seize sensitive
cargoes that may be in transit to and from states and non-state actors of
proliferation concern. Since then, we have been working with ten other
countries - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK - to develop a set of "principles" that
identify practical steps necessary to interdict shipments of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials at sea, in the
air, or on land. The eleven countries met in Madrid in June, and in Brisbane
in July. On September 4 in Paris, we reached agreement and announced a
Statement of Interdiction Principles. This represents the shared political
commitment of these countries to strengthen efforts to combat the
proliferation threat. The United States welcomes support for the PSI
Principles of all states that share our concerns about proliferation and our
resolve to take new and active measures to defeat this threat. Proliferators
are using increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to defeat
export controls and obtain technologies for their WMD or missile programs;
we need to enhance our ability to prevent them from making these
acquisitions. There exists a wide-spread consensus that this menace,
together with terrorism, constitutes the greatest challenge to international
security generally and to our national security in particular.

It is important to stress that all interdiction activities conducted
by PSI partners will be consistent with relevant national and international
authorities. Importanly, substantial national and international authorities
for interdiction already exist. In the event that a proliferator succeeds in
circumventing export controls and a shipment of WMD or missile-related
technology is discovered to be en route, PSI participants will explore how
best to use the full range of counterproliferation tools -- from diplomatic,
to intelligence, to operational -- to stop proliferation at sea, in the air,
and on land. Properly planned and executed, interception of critical
technologies while en route can prevent hostile states and non-state actors
from acquiring these dangerous capabilities. At a minimum, interdiction can
lengthen the time that proliferators will need to acquire new weapons
capabilities, increase the cost, and demonstrate our resolve to combat
proliferation.

The Paris meeting also continued work on the modalities for
interdiction, in particular effective information sharing and operational
capabilities for interdictions. Efforts to enhance our collective
operational capabilities for action are essential. In support of this goal,
PSI participants have agreed on a series of ten sea, air, and ground
interdiction training exercises to occur into 2004. Australia just organized
and executed one such exercise a few days ago in the Coral Sea, called
"Pacific Protector," that involved both military and law enforcement assets.
Four PSI partners, including the United States, sent vessels to the
exercise, and all PSI partners were involved in some capacity.

Our long-term objective with the Proliferation Security Initiative is
to create a web of counterproliferation partnerships that will impede trade
in WMD, delivery systems, and related materials. To do so, we seek
eventually to broaden participation in the PSI to include all like-minded
countries that want to cooperate and can contribute actively to interdiction
efforts. WMD and missile proliferation is a global problem that requires a
global effort, and this initiative is not directed at any one country or
region. It is global in scope. A robust interdiction effort requires
cooperation with all like-minded countries - those who are leaders in
nonproliferation as well as those who may have a direct relationship with
proliferation activities. We want to ensure that countries make full use of
their capabilities and authorities to interdict shipments. By working
together, the combined sum of our efforts will be greater than the
individual parts. I am encouraged by our progress on the PSI, and know that
the PSI will be an important tool that we can use to counter the efforts of
countries such as Syria that are often dependent on foreign suppliers in
their quest to possess WMD.

Before I address the specifics of Syria's WMD programs, let me first
discuss press reports that Iraq covertly transferred weapons of mass
destruction to Syria in an attempt to hide them from UN inspectors and
Coalition forces. We have seen these reports, reviewed them carefully, and
see them as cause for concern. Thus far, we have been unable to confirm that
such transfers occurred. We are continuing with the full breadth of
resources at our command to seek conclusive evidence that any such transfer
has taken place. We have raised with the Syrians on numerous occasions, even
before military action against Iraq, the seriousness with which we would
view any transfer of Iraqi dual-use or military related items into Syria.

We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition
forces in Iraq. Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the
eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to
attack and kill our service members during the war, and is still doing so.
Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to Hizballah in
Lebanon, which has killed hundreds of Americans in the past. Statements from
many of Syria's public officials during this time vilified the Coalition's
motives in seeking to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Indeed, the United States
portrayed as an enemy is a consistent theme found in newspapers and public
statements in Syria as it is in other states in the region. Although
Damascus has increased its cooperation regarding Iraq since the fall of the
Iraqi regime, its behavior during Operation Iraqi Freedom underscores the
importance of taking seriously reports and information on Syria's WMD
capabilities.

Nuclear
As I informed Congress last fall, we are concerned about Syria's
nuclear R&D program and continue to watch for any signs of nuclear weapons
activity or foreign assistance that could facilitate a Syrian nuclear
weapons capability. We are aware of Syrian efforts to acquire dual-use
technologies-some, through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Technical Cooperation program-that could be applied to a nuclear weapons
program. In addition, Russia and Syria have approved a draft program on
cooperation on civil nuclear power. Broader access to Russian expertise
could provide opportunities for Syria to expand its indigenous capabilities,
should it decide to pursue nuclear weapons. The Syrians have a
Chinese-supplied "miniature" research reactor under IAEA safeguards at Dayr
Al Hajar.

Syria is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has a standard
safeguards agreement with the IAEA but, like Iran, has not yet signed or, to
our knowledge, even begun negotiations on the IAEA Additional Protocol. The
Additional Protocol is an important tool that, if fully implemented, could
strengthen the IAEA's investigative powers to verify compliance with NPT
safeguards obligations and provides the IAEA with the ability to act quickly
on any indicators of undeclared nuclear materials, facilities and
activities. We believe the Additional Protocol should be a new minimal
standard for countries to demonstrate their nonproliferation bona fides.

Chemical
Since the 1970s Syria has pursued what is now one of the most advanced
Arab state chemical weapons (CW) capabilities. It has a stockpile of the
nerve agent sarin that can be delivered by aircraft or ballistic missiles,
and has engaged in the research and development of more toxic and persistent
nerve agents such as VX.

Syria is fully committed to expanding and improving its CW program,
which it believes serves as a deterrent to regional adversaries. Syria
continues active chemical munitions testing, although it has not used
chemical agents in any conflicts. Although Syria is more self-sufficient
than most other third-world CW capable states, foreign assistance has been a
key element in the establishment and operation of Syria's CW program. In
particular, Syria remains heavily dependent on foreign sources for key
elements of its chemical warfare program, including precursor chemicals and
key production equipment. As a result Syria will need to continue foreign
procurement activities - something the PSI is designed to counter -- in
order to continue its CW program. Syria is not a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention.

Biological
We believe that Syria is continuing to develop an offensive biological
weapons capability. Syria has signed, but not ratified, the Biological
Weapons Convention. These "poor man's nuclear weapons" do not require a
large production capability, and depending on the agent and dissemination
method, can be extremely lethal.


Missiles
Syria has a combined total of several hundred Scud and SS-21 SRBMs,
and is believed to have chemical warheads available for a portion of its
Scud missile force. Syria has also developed a longer-range missile -- the
Scud D -- with assistance from North Korea. Syria's missiles are mobile and
can reach much of Israel from positions near their peacetime garrisons and
portions of Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the
country. Damascus is pursuing both solid- and liquid-propellant missile
programs and relies extensively on foreign assistance in these endeavors.
North Korean and Iranian entities have been most prominent in aiding Syria's
recent ballistic missile development. Syrian regional concerns may lead
Damascus to seek a longer range ballistic missile capability such as North
Korea's No Dong MRBM.

Advanced Conventional Weapons
Damascus has sought to acquire Russian SA-10 and SA-11 air defense
systems, MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, and T-80 or T-90 main battle tanks, as
well as upgrades for the aircraft, armored weapons, or air defense systems
already in its inventory. But its inability to fund large purchases and its
outstanding debt to Russia have curbed substantial upgrades and
acquisitions.

Conclusion
Of course, I will have much more to say on all of these subjects
during the closed hearing and I look forward to a more specific and detailed
discussion than we can have in an open hearing. As we all recognize, the
importance of protecting and preserving vital intelligence sources and
methods necessarily and properly restricts what we can say publicly.
Nonetheless, the conduct of national security requires that we take all
available information into account, which I believe we will be able to do in
a classified session.

When the world witnessed the destructive potential of terrorism on
September 11, we were reminded of the need to remain steadfast in
recognizing emerging threats to our security. In Syria we see expanding WMD
capabilities and continued state sponsorship of terrorism. As the President
has said, we cannot allow the world's most dangerous weapons to fall into
the hands of the world's most dangerous regimes, and will work tirelessly to
ensure this is not the case for Syria.



---------------------------------------------------------


"Without question, among rogue states, those most aggressively seeking to
acquire or develop WMD and their means of delivery, and which are therefore
threats to our national security, are Iran and North Korea, followed by
Libya and Syria."

Libya and Syria are the easier targets. Gadhafi already caved. Syria will
cave very shortly. Iran is showing signs of bending, but are emboldened by
Russia's unwillingness to suspend nuke support to them. North Korea is the
final piece of the puzzle. We'll practice containment without direct
provocation until the other three are dealt with. I suspect we already
struck a deal with China over the Taiwan issue which will lead them to help
us with the N. Korean problem.