|
Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote:
Actually, the GPS was not in use. It was just that nobody thought to check if it was for 600 nm. Reconnecting the antenna would have solved the problem, as would have several of the other things nobody bothered to check. They were "integrated-bridge-system centric." A significant difference. It's a point, but let me explain why I'd put the main blame to "GPS centric". When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. Since the GPS wasn't working, the integrated system reverted to DR (and obviously did a damn fine job, considering) and followed the prescribed track (here, I'm not sure of a doppler input). Other than a cursory check of the Loran and, it would appear, no system check of the GPS (no celestial was used) the "system" was allowed to proceed.... i.e., the Loran positions were not all that far from the assumed GPS. Now, on the approach to the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway, things should have changed. Your Loran is pretty good, You come on soundings, You have Radar Targets, You can make allowances to use visual checks, You know there are strong, contrary currents in the area, but none of these tools were seriously used and none of the dangers were considered. Why? Because the navigators were GPS centric, believing their Nav Plotter was getting the correct information from the GPS and not using other "systems" to confirm that this information was correct. The fault here was not GPS nor the integrated system. The fault here was navigators relying solely on one system to be correct all the time. If you are going to be navigating, you want back-ups to your back-ups. Sure, You can carry 20 hand helds and 4 cases of batteries, but what happens when the Chit, negatively hits the fan and all you know is GPS? What happens when the system fails and you are not aware of it and you go merrily on your way, believing it's working? No, they were GPS Centric. They believed everything was fine, when a system check would have said otherwise. They didn't use back-ups/double checks, they believed the GPS would always work so consequently the integrated nav system must be correct and never needed checking on, for whatever reason. Basically what I'm saying is go back to the first basic error. The GPS wasn't working, no one checked to see if it was... they were "centric" in that they assumed it would be, when in truth, for any number of reasons it may not be and the prudent navigator realizes this and checks, especially in areas such as the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway. otn |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 01:59:45 GMT, otnmbrd
wrote: When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. ==================================== LORAN has always been worthless in Bermuda unless something has changed in the last 10 years that I'm not aware of. Prior to GPS we used to lose electronic navigation about 400 miles offshore. |
Wayne.B wrote:
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 01:59:45 GMT, otnmbrd wrote: When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. ==================================== LORAN has always been worthless in Bermuda unless something has changed in the last 10 years that I'm not aware of. Prior to GPS we used to lose electronic navigation about 400 miles offshore. Worthless in what way? Accuracy or reliable signal? I ask, because that was not my experience. Assuming you are correct and this applied to the ship also, would you agree that as they approached the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway that Loran became useful? I ask because it does not appear that they were having a problem with Loran reliability at sea, but also because it's use became more important as they approached land, if, as I say, they were GPS Centric, when others systems could have "saved the day". otn |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 03:21:21 GMT, otnmbrd
wrote: Worthless in what way? Accuracy or reliable signal? Reliable signal. My experience with LORAN in Bermuda is somewhat dated and things may have improved, or you may have better equipment on large ships than we did on sail boats in the late '80s. By the early 90s everyone was using GPS so LORAN didn't get much attention after that. My present boat has two very decent LORAN units aboard and neither are connected, mostly for lack of antenna space. Don't really miss them with 3 GPS units, 3 chart plotters, and two radars available. I ask, because that was not my experience. Assuming you are correct and this applied to the ship also, would you agree that as they approached the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway that Loran became useful? LORAN should have been quite usable in that area in my experience. The only time we had difficulty with coastal LORAN was during severe thunderstorms. One of my units would also jump out of sync occasionally but the error was so large as to be immediately obvious. |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 01:59:45 GMT, otnmbrd
wrote: Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote: Actually, the GPS was not in use. It was just that nobody thought to check if it was for 600 nm. Reconnecting the antenna would have solved the problem, as would have several of the other things nobody bothered to check. They were "integrated-bridge-system centric." A significant difference. It's a point, but let me explain why I'd put the main blame to "GPS centric". When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. Since the GPS wasn't working, the integrated system reverted to DR (and obviously did a damn fine job, considering) and followed the prescribed track (here, I'm not sure of a doppler input). Other than a cursory check of the Loran and, it would appear, no system check of the GPS (no celestial was used) the "system" was allowed to proceed.... i.e., the Loran positions were not all that far from the assumed GPS. Now, on the approach to the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway, things should have changed. Your Loran is pretty good, You come on soundings, You have Radar Targets, You can make allowances to use visual checks, You know there are strong, contrary currents in the area, but none of these tools were seriously used and none of the dangers were considered. Why? Because the navigators were GPS centric, believing their Nav Plotter was getting the correct information from the GPS and not using other "systems" to confirm that this information was correct. The fault here was not GPS nor the integrated system. The fault here was navigators relying solely on one system to be correct all the time. If you are going to be navigating, you want back-ups to your back-ups. Sure, You can carry 20 hand helds and 4 cases of batteries, but what happens when the Chit, negatively hits the fan and all you know is GPS? What happens when the system fails and you are not aware of it and you go merrily on your way, believing it's working? No, they were GPS Centric. They believed everything was fine, when a system check would have said otherwise. They didn't use back-ups/double checks, they believed the GPS would always work so consequently the integrated nav system must be correct and never needed checking on, for whatever reason. Basically what I'm saying is go back to the first basic error. The GPS wasn't working, no one checked to see if it was... they were "centric" in that they assumed it would be, when in truth, for any number of reasons it may not be and the prudent navigator realizes this and checks, especially in areas such as the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway. otn We agree on what went on. I would still call it what I did. They didn't ask the bridge system what input it was using. Idiots anyway, for all their licenses. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a "Accordions don't play 'Lady of Spain.' People play 'Lady of Spain." |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 03:21:21 GMT, otnmbrd
wrote: Wayne.B wrote: On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 01:59:45 GMT, otnmbrd wrote: When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. ==================================== LORAN has always been worthless in Bermuda unless something has changed in the last 10 years that I'm not aware of. Prior to GPS we used to lose electronic navigation about 400 miles offshore. Worthless in what way? Accuracy or reliable signal? I ask, because that was not my experience. Assuming you are correct and this applied to the ship also, would you agree that as they approached the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway that Loran became useful? I ask because it does not appear that they were having a problem with Loran reliability at sea, but also because it's use became more important as they approached land, if, as I say, they were GPS Centric, when others systems could have "saved the day". otn According to the report, the loran was behaving correctly near Nantucket, where it mattered. Nobody believed it. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a "Accordions don't play 'Lady of Spain.' People play 'Lady of Spain." |
"Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: "Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: Anyone who has been on a boat knows that a GPS *DOES NOT* for all practical purposes work all of the time. I've had a GPS fail several times, I've seen charting inaccuracies a number of times. Similar things have happened to almost every cruiser I know. You lead an unlucky life. I have never seen a significant outage of the GPS. I follow the tech literature on the subject. Aside from deliberate military actions the outages are very few, far between, and limited in time duration. As I said I have never seen one. You mean, other that the outages that have happened, there have been none? I'll admit the system has been pretty stable but individual satellites are taken down which causes minor hiccups. Several weeks ago, my wife's car GPS was off by a quarter mile for about 5 minutes - I have no idea what the cause was, but it could have been a problem on a boat. It is of course possible that you have a source of interference on your boat. That does happen. It is one of the reasons that multiple GPSs are sensible. Different devices have different weaknesses. I am sure there are also some specific locations that have a multi-path problem. Again though few and far between. GPS ain't perfect but it is very close. Done with redundant instruments on the open sea it is, for all practical purposes, perfect. The problem that has bit me a few times is that I use a handheld which is connected to its cable every time I use the boat. If the power connection isn't solid, it can fall back to battery power, and then shut off a few hours later. I keep spare cables and batteries, but when it happens, I'm down for a few minutes. And although I often have a chart cartridge, I've found occasional "dropouts" in the coverage - rather disconcerting when you're in a tricky section of the ICW and the chart screen suddenly goes blank. On my previous boat (Nonsuch 30) I would lose signal sometimes. I assumed it was from the wishbone boom, but others claimed the antennae was too low and the signal was blocked by crew members; perhaps both causes were factors. I've never been hit by lightning, by I know many others that have, and the GPS is frequently a victim. I've also heard of GPS's damaged by power spikes. Actually, the first time I took a GPS on a trip its menu button was damaged so it was virtually useless. Having a spare GPS, and batteries, cables, etc. on board is useful and prudent, but it doesn't help when you lose the primary in a tricky situation. While these problems are infrequent, and often "operator error" it does not mean they don't happen. And having a strategy to cope, such as carrying a redundant GPS doesn't help you for the time it takes find it and fire it up. The present cruiser population is certainly and effectively completely dependent on GPS for off shore navigation. At this point I don't think there are many exceptions left. I have not come across a report of a significant problem with that in a long time. What's your point? The vast majority of boaters don't go offshore. And obviously, piloting techniques are not commonly used off shore. You keep trying to equate piloting with celestial; they're are not the same thing. Charting inaccuracies are chart problems very close to completely. Without gps they are hard to detect. The ones on the West coast of Mexico however are detectible with a good LORAN. Without GPS the charting inaccuracies would not be as important. As I mentioned before, I watched a trawler run aground because they trusted the GPS and didn't watch the depth. None of these incidents were a major problem for me because I was using other techniques and was able to recognize the situation and compensate. The issue here is not which technique is the most accurate, or which should be used to the exclusion of the other. Continuing to cast it in these terms make you look like a jaxian fool. One uses all reasonable methods available. The first and primary of these is GPS. Your inablity to understand this simple statement is almost jaxian. The question isn't what should be used first; the question is what should be taught first. Your inability to understand that is beyond jaxian. Teaching someone GPS before basic piloting is like teaching children how to use a calculator before teaching them the addition table. We disagree..not about the need to teach piloting but upon the base on which you develop that piloting skill. DR is simply the technique that is adopted between fixes to plot ones position for the period of time until a new fix is available. But an electronic navigation system provides continuous position fixes...so DR really has no place. LOPs and such come up in piloting and I agree that one uses whatever is available and reasonable to maintain a cross check. The eye is a very useful tool for this when visibility is adequate. Radar also can well provide such a cross check. When running multiple electronic navigation systems they can cross check each other. All of these skills should be taught. I have this strange feeling you guys are taking this position because you feel, as I do, that GPS based navigation is easier to teach and to do than non electronic piloting. So the real reason you want non-electronic first is so the new students have to suffer like you did. The issue is that you claimed it was foolish to teach someone basic piloting, even when the person was eager to learn. This attitude marks you as a complete fool, Jim. I hope I never meet one of your students on the water. No my argument was that basic navigation...not piloting...was better taught with GPS as the primary technique. It was in response to an individual teaching basic navigation with electronic aids removed. Actually, the case was that someone was learning how to do LOP's and DR and wasn't interested in LORAN. You called this "utter nonsense." I call your attitude "sheer stupidity." So again we disagree. The instructor wanted to teach without the use of the electronic navigation systems...I consider this nonsense. You end up with a less trained student who initially is far less able to navigate. Why would one teach a student to navigate so as to get an inferior outcome at least during the initial phases of training? I would want them as capable as possible as early as possible for the sake of their and others safety. It is even possible that the individual involved and I would end at the same end point. Just different routings. It is remotely possible, but someone who learns how to use a GPS first is rather unlikely to then learn basic piloting. And this is the essential point of my argument. Anyone can teach them self how to use a GPS; learning piloting usually takes instruction and practice. If I only have a student for a few hours, I'd rather spend time on something that's harder to learn, and just as important. Most of the concepts of piloting relate to GPS usage, so nothing is wasted. And I think that basic piloting is best taught in the GPS centric context. Once a reasonable skill level is reached one starts on what to do when something breaks. And you again utterly misstate my position. GPS is the first skill taught...it should be the centerpiece of the navigation system. Then others. Certainly even the dullest of students can learn to check a chart position via eyeball or radar. Are you daft, man? Are you claiming now that piloting need not be taught because "even the dullest" can do it without training? And radar too? Bizarre, considering you've confessed to have weak radar skills! Listen carefully. Pilotage is important. One teaches navigation with the GPS first. One person might do that, the rest of us will teach properly, thank you. The first portion of that instruction is the use of charts. agreed. A current student however should learn with the GPS positon centric techniques rather than the LOP techniques of conventional DR. DR doesn't involve LOPs. Its clear your understanding in this area is weak. Yes eventually these get taught also...but secondary to what is the real world. Eventually? Yea, right. You asserted that learning LOP's and DR was "utter nonsense." I think no one should be trusted with a GPS until the learn these basics. Uhhh where did it state that learning LOPs and DR was "utter nonsense"? I think I made such a comment about teaching a student navigation with such techniques emphasized to the exclusion of electronic navigation. Still do. Perhaps you should re-read your fist post in this thread. Dave said his daughter was enjoying learning LOP's and DR, and wasn't interested in the Loran. Your response was "Ohh stop...what utter nonsense." You went on to spew more silliness which only served to make you feel important and make everyone else think you're a fool. The remark was in the context of claiming to teach navigation without the electronic systems. Dave was featuring it as a good thing. I believe it a bad thing. Leads to a new sailor with more limited skills than if taught the electronic approach up front. Nowhere was it mentioned that Dave's daughter would not go on to learn other techniques, or that she was even destined to be a boat's navigator. It was only stated that she enjoyed learning basic piloting. Frankly criticizing anyone for wanting to learn almost anything is a mark of a very small mind. And you technophobes lack the prospective to see the outcome of your teaching primary dependence on outdated technology. You correctly point out that it will be difficult to teach DR/LOP after one learns electronic navigation. That is because it is difficult to convince the student that sufficient value exists in such techniques. You deal with this value problem by teaching DR/LOP first. There's a bit more to it, but OK ... I claim simple that this in no way prevents the knowledge of DR/LOP going away real fast. I think we need to develop that set of DR/LOP skills that will actually stick after electronic navigation is learned. If we can't develop such a set and convince the newby of value then the outcome is the same. The way to do this is to actively practice "manual techniques" even while using a GPS. I've never known someone who learned GPS first who did this. However, once you have actually navigated by LOP's, or following depth contours, or watching "danger bearings," it starts to become automatic. When I see a buoy line up with a point of land, I mentally follow the line on the chart and check the depth I should be in. It only takes a second, but would someone who had never done that "for real" bother to do it? And it does for electronic navigators as well. You learn to correlate the views of the eye and other devices with the GPS or whatever. I stress the electronic navigation first because I think it more important they do that well than that they master an initial set of techniques they will abandon upon learning the electronic version. First good at the primary system then good at the secondaries. Too bad the world doesn't work this way. We could teach calculators in the third grade because the kids could be trusted to learn long division later. I introduce VOR/DME and RDF merely to demonstrate that we really don't propose to teach all available navigation techniques...only those that we believe useful and reasonable. There are lots of techniques that are arcane or obsolete. They may be of interest to the advanced navigator or hobbies, but they are in a different category from piloting, especially when the equipment isn't often carried on board. The NTSB study blamed several "probable causes:" over reliance on GPS, and lack of training of the officers, and the failure to recognize the problem from other cues. This is a perfect example of problem with your approach. Claiming that your strategy works, but in this case they were incompetent is foolish. http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/1997/MAR9701.pdf I am reasonably familiar with the report. Find for me any mention of over reliance on GPS. It does find fault with over reliance on the automatic features of integrated bridge systems. Calling it a "system" was a euphemism. It was a GPS attached to an autopilot. They ignored the depth sounder, the radar, and visual cues. Actually, the same thing could have happened to most anyone with an Autohelm and a Garmin, except the the Autohelm (now Raymarine) gives a better indication of faulty input. Neither the page of causals nor the 3 pages of recommendations has a single mention of the term GPS...not one. There were a number of failures but not one that indicates GPS was a problem. Incompetent seamanship is the proximate cause with poorly designed and poorly operated equipment creating the opportunity for the incompetent seaman to ground the boat. It also discusses flaws in the design of such systems. I agree that total reliance on a single GPS is not wise. I generally run three...and two are active in the process to try to avoid the entry errors that I believe are the worst problems with GPS navigation. When the europeans get their system operative or the Russians complete theirs I will almost certainly run one GPS off another system. I will also use other inputs like depthsounders and radar to help prevent errors. So you turn on 3 gps's for a day sail? I think you'd be better served by brushing up on more basic skills. No I use 2 GPS for serious navigation and hold a third in reserve. Both active GPS have the same way points set. The position of the hand held is plotted on the chart. And all this is cross checked with eye and radar. I use true headings unless we have to hand steer when we work out the magnetic. When I go day sailing in Long Beach I may not crack open a chart or turn on a GPS. I can drive a boat just like you do. On a clear day in a familiar port I need little navigation help from anything. But running to Catalina in the dark..chart open,,, two GPSs up and going as well as radar for collisiion avoidance. |
"otnmbrd" wrote in message ink.net... Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote: Actually, the GPS was not in use. It was just that nobody thought to check if it was for 600 nm. Reconnecting the antenna would have solved the problem, as would have several of the other things nobody bothered to check. They were "integrated-bridge-system centric." A significant difference. It's a point, but let me explain why I'd put the main blame to "GPS centric". When they left Bermuda they had three systems available for Navigation. GPS, Loran, Celestial. Since the GPS wasn't working, the integrated system reverted to DR (and obviously did a damn fine job, considering) and followed the prescribed track (here, I'm not sure of a doppler input). Other than a cursory check of the Loran and, it would appear, no system check of the GPS (no celestial was used) the "system" was allowed to proceed.... i.e., the Loran positions were not all that far from the assumed GPS. Sure they were. by the time they were 200 miles out they had a multiple mile error. The chief officier and navigator both stated that a cross check of the LORAN was done. The second officier stated the LORAN was used only as a backup to the GPS. The NTSB found that the LORAN was never checked and should have been. Now, on the approach to the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway, things should have changed. Your Loran is pretty good, You come on soundings, You have Radar Targets, You can make allowances to use visual checks, You know there are strong, contrary currents in the area, but none of these tools were seriously used and none of the dangers were considered. Why? Because the navigators were GPS centric, believing their Nav Plotter was getting the correct information from the GPS and not using other "systems" to confirm that this information was correct. The fault here was not GPS nor the integrated system. The fault here was navigators relying solely on one system to be correct all the time. They had failure indicators staring them in the face the whole time. They just never looked. Makes little difference what the failure is if the indicator is not noted. If you are going to be navigating, you want back-ups to your back-ups. Sure, You can carry 20 hand helds and 4 cases of batteries, but what happens when the Chit, negatively hits the fan and all you know is GPS? No they were simply not very competent. They were plotting the positions hourly...but taking the positon from the busted system. Plotting the positon from one of your 20 handhelds would have blown the whistle before they were an hour into the failure. What happens when the system fails and you are not aware of it and you go merrily on your way, believing it's working? No, they were GPS Centric. They believed everything was fine, when a system check would have said otherwise. They didn't use back-ups/double checks, they believed the GPS would always work so consequently the integrated nav system must be correct and never needed checking on, for whatever reason. Basically what I'm saying is go back to the first basic error. The GPS wasn't working, no one checked to see if it was... they were "centric" in that they assumed it would be, when in truth, for any number of reasons it may not be and the prudent navigator realizes this and checks, especially in areas such as the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway. otn And a major finding was that the system design was deficient in a number of human factor ways that provided the environment for the grounding. For instance the GPS had a suitable external alarm...which was not hooked up. The report strongly suggest that redundant receivers should also have been part of the system. The system should have cross checked the LORAN and the GPS. All kind of simple stuff. Jim |
"Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message ... On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 11:47:55 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message . .. On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 04:49:38 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: One uses all reasonable methods available. The first and primary of these is GPS. Your inablity to understand this simple statement is almost jaxian. Wow, we're making progress. So you finally do agree with the rest of everyone else here that, while it's fine to have GPS as a primary means of navigation, relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy. Bull Steve...you Luddites simply read to confirm your opinions. I have never anywhere suggested any such thing. Did you notice that Jeff Morris cannot even read an NTSB report without getting it wrong? The actual conclusions do not meet his pre-conception so he simply misquotes them. You technophobes are all alike. That's a shame, progress cancelled. I guess I'll take you at your word when you claim just above that you never anywhere suggested relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy ... even though just above that you said one uses all reasonable methods [of navigation] available. Ok, its true that the two statements are not exactly the same thing so it's ok for you to say on the one hand that one uses all reasonable methods available and on the other hand expouse that it's not foolhardy to rely totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods. However, the fact that you are the *only* one here (as far as I can tell) who feels that way should tell you something. Steve The report does not mention GPS or GPS centric in its Causals or 3 pages of recommendations. The ship had procedures to cross check which were not followed. They had a working LORAN showing multiple miles of differential from the GPS. They never looked even though it was supposedly a regular procedure. I am sure there were radar navigation discrepancies as well. And the officiers reported the sighting of two buoys that were not there. Sounds like a pretty high level of incompetence to me...not relying on a single method. Jim |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 00:25:10 -0800, "Jim Donohue"
wrote: No I use 2 GPS for serious navigation and hold a third in reserve. Both active GPS have the same way points set. The position of the hand held is plotted on the chart. And all this is cross checked with eye and radar. I use true headings unless we have to hand steer when we work out the magnetic. GPS might be too precise, though.... I know a few people using a bouy as a waypoint using a GPS coupled to an autosteer......well, they sure did find out when that waypoint was reached.....g Cheers! Remco |
Remco Moedt wrote:
GPS might be too precise, though.... I know a few people using a bouy as a waypoint using a GPS coupled to an autosteer......well, they sure did find out when that waypoint was reached.....g Quite a few GPS manuals point out this danger. Even before selective availability was dropped this was an issue (and not only for LNB's). -- Good luck and good sailing. s/v Kerry Deare of Barnegat http://kerrydeare.home.comcast.net/ |
It's a problem with airplanes too. It used to be that planes were
spread out a couple of miles laterally on a route. Now, everyone who doesn't have the wit to put in some intentional offset is flying down the same 100 foot wide lane. -- Roger Long |
Jim Donohue wrote:
Calling it a "system" was a euphemism. It was a GPS attached to an autopilot. They ignored the depth sounder, the radar, and visual cues. Actually, the same thing could have happened to most anyone with an Autohelm and a Garmin, except the the Autohelm (now Raymarine) gives a better indication of faulty input. Neither the page of causals nor the 3 pages of recommendations has a single mention of the term GPS...not one. There were a number of failures but not one that indicates GPS was a problem. Incompetent seamanship is the proximate cause with poorly designed and poorly operated equipment creating the opportunity for the incompetent seaman to ground the boat. You've made this claim several times and its total Bull****! You're claiming, in essence, that because the satellites broadcast a good signal, there is no problem with over-reliance on GPS. This is a textbook case in what can go wrong with such over-reliance. The bizarre thing here is that on one hand you've been arguing that GPS should be learned first because it is nearly perfect, but then here you're claiming that the problem was the "incompetent seaman" who relied too much on GPS. In the "Conclusions" section of the report the NTSB describes what happened and what went wrong. The majority of the 22 conclusions talk about the failure of the GPS (mentioning it specifically) system or the failure to double check by other means, i.e. the over-reliance on one system. Here's some examples: 5. Had the fathometer alarm been set to 3 meters, as was the stated practice, or had the second officer chosen to display the fathometer data on the control console, he would have been alerted that the Royal Majesty was in far shallower water than expected and, thus, was off course. He would have been alerted perhaps as long as 40 minutes before the grounding, and the situation could have been corrected. 6. The watch officers’ monitoring of the status of the vessel’s global positioning system was deficient throughout the voyage from St. George’s. 7. Deliberate cross checking between the global positioning system and the Loran-C to verify the Royal Majesty’s position was not being performed and should have been on the voyage from St. George’s. 8. Even though it is likely that the watch officers were not aware of the limitation inherent in using the position-fix alarm to monitor the accuracy of GPS position data, it was inappropriate for them to rely solely on the alarm to warn them of any problems with the GPS data. 9. The sighting of lights not normally observed in the traffic lanes, the second officer’s inability to confirm the presence of the BB buoy, and the sighting of blue and white water should have taken precedence over the automation display on the central console and compelled the second officer to promptly use all available means to verify his position. 10. The chief officer and the second officer did not observe good watchkeeping practices or act with heightened awareness of the precautions that are needed when a vessel approaches the Boston traffic lanes and landfall. 11. The master’s methods for monitoring the progress of the voyage did not account for the technical capabilities and limitations of the automated equipment. 12. The watch officers on the Royal Majesty may have believed that because the global positioning system had demonstrated sufficient reliability over 3 1/2 years, the traditional practice of using at least two independent sources of position information was not necessary. 13. All the watchstanding officers were overly reliant on the automated position display of the navigation and command system 25 and were, for all intents and purposes, sailing the map display instead of using navigation aids or lookout information. The report continues with other items in the same vein, though focused more on the problems with the integrated system and the training, such as: 16. Had the navigation and command system 25 autopilot been configured to compare position data from multiple independent position receivers and had a corresponding alarm been installed that activated when discrepancies were detected, the grounding of the Royal Majesty may have been avoided. Although the "Probable Cause" section which follows does not mention GPS specifically, it is quite short (two small paragraphs) and mentions simply "overreliance on the automated features of the integrated bridge system," the lack of training, and the failure to take "corrective action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course." In other words, they relied too much on one source of position (the gps) and ignored others. While the "Recommendations" section does not mention GPS specifically, it clearly recommends against over reliance on one system. We've never claimed there was anything "wrong" with GPS, only that other forms of navigation are just as important. The report includes comments like: Review the bridge watchstanding practices on all its vessels, and revise, as necessary, to ensure that all watch officers adhere to sound watchstanding practices and procedures, including using landmarks, soundings, and navigational aids to verify a vessel’s position, relying on more than one source for position information, and reporting to the master any failure to detect important navigational aids. .... As part of the foreign flag passenger ship control verification examination program, verify that the watchstanding procedures of ships’ officers include the use of multiple independent means of position verification. It is true that the bulk of the recommendations have to do with better standards for automated systems, but even then it deals largely with the need to use more than one form of input: comparing position-receiver data for significant discrepancies between position receivers, and subsequent positive annunciation to the crew; Sorry Jim, its clear that you've been disingenuous with us. The NTSB study is quite specific in finding fault with relying completely on GPS. Though they don't fault the GPS system itself (i.e. the signal leaving the satellite) they make it quite clear the overreliance on one electronic navigation system was the cause of the grounding. |
Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote:
We agree on what went on. I would still call it what I did. They didn't ask the bridge system what input it was using. Idiots anyway, for all their licenses. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a System checks .... an important pre-departure and daily check that is becoming more involved. At any rate, we can disagree on the basic "Centric" fault, the results were the same. otn |
Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote:
According to the report, the loran was behaving correctly near Nantucket, where it mattered. Nobody believed it. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a G GPS Centric otn |
Jim Donohue wrote:
The question isn't what should be used first; the question is what should be taught first. Your inability to understand that is beyond jaxian. Teaching someone GPS before basic piloting is like teaching children how to use a calculator before teaching them the addition table. We disagree..not about the need to teach piloting but upon the base on which you develop that piloting skill. DR is simply the technique that is adopted between fixes to plot ones position for the period of time until a new fix is available. But an electronic navigation system provides continuous position fixes...so DR really has no place. Absolute nonsense. LOPs and such come up in piloting and I agree that one uses whatever is available and reasonable to maintain a cross check. The eye is a very useful tool for this when visibility is adequate. Radar also can well provide such a cross check. When running multiple electronic navigation systems they can cross check each other. All of these skills should be taught. I have this strange feeling you guys are taking this position because you feel, as I do, that GPS based navigation is easier to teach and to do than non electronic piloting. So the real reason you want non-electronic first is so the new students have to suffer like you did. Not at all. My only desire is to have the best navigators out on the water. Perhaps you should look at the curriculum of the Power Squadron, or the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Although both offer "quicky" courses for GPS, acknowledging that many boaters will only tolerate a few hours of instruction, their full courses follow the tradition path of charts, compasses, DR and piloting before introducing GPS. Actually, the case was that someone was learning how to do LOP's and DR and wasn't interested in LORAN. You called this "utter nonsense." I call your attitude "sheer stupidity." So again we disagree. The instructor wanted to teach without the use of the electronic navigation systems...I consider this nonsense. You end up with a less trained student who initially is far less able to navigate. Why would one teach a student to navigate so as to get an inferior outcome at least during the initial phases of training? I would want them as capable as possible as early as possible for the sake of their and others safety. You should re-read the original post and your response. .... Uhhh where did it state that learning LOPs and DR was "utter nonsense"? I think I made such a comment about teaching a student navigation with such techniques emphasized to the exclusion of electronic navigation. Still do. Perhaps you should re-read your fist post in this thread. Dave said his daughter was enjoying learning LOP's and DR, and wasn't interested in the Loran. Your response was "Ohh stop...what utter nonsense." You went on to spew more silliness which only served to make you feel important and make everyone else think you're a fool. The remark was in the context of claiming to teach navigation without the electronic systems. Dave was featuring it as a good thing. I believe it a bad thing. Leads to a new sailor with more limited skills than if taught the electronic approach up front. Your approach pretty much guarantees that most students will never learn the basics. It's a good thing the most teachers disagree with you. Nowhere was it mentioned that Dave's daughter would not go on to learn other techniques, or that she was even destined to be a boat's navigator. It was only stated that she enjoyed learning basic piloting. Frankly criticizing anyone for wanting to learn almost anything is a mark of a very small mind. And you technophobes lack the prospective to see the outcome of your teaching primary dependence on outdated technology. Technophobe? I love it! You should realize that 25 years ago I was programing spacecraft navigation for NASA. I'm now retired from IBM after spending about 30 years working on cutting edge technology. I'm not afraid of technology, I just have a realistic view of its limitations. The way to do this is to actively practice "manual techniques" even while using a GPS. I've never known someone who learned GPS first who did this. However, once you have actually navigated by LOP's, or following depth contours, or watching "danger bearings," it starts to become automatic. When I see a buoy line up with a point of land, I mentally follow the line on the chart and check the depth I should be in. It only takes a second, but would someone who had never done that "for real" bother to do it? And it does for electronic navigators as well. You learn to correlate the views of the eye and other devices with the GPS or whatever. This is exactly what I've been talking about. My point has been that those who learn GPS first don't bother to learn this. Calling it a "system" was a euphemism. It was a GPS attached to an autopilot. They ignored the depth sounder, the radar, and visual cues. Actually, the same thing could have happened to most anyone with an Autohelm and a Garmin, except the the Autohelm (now Raymarine) gives a better indication of faulty input. Neither the page of causals nor the 3 pages of recommendations has a single mention of the term GPS...not one. There were a number of failures but not one that indicates GPS was a problem. Incompetent seamanship is the proximate cause with poorly designed and poorly operated equipment creating the opportunity for the incompetent seaman to ground the boat. Refer to my other post on this. Its pretty clear that you're blatantly lying here - the page on conclusions talks mostly about the problem of relying too much on GPS. The "Cause" section very short and though it doesn't mention GPS by name, it is explicit in blaming overreliance on one form of navigation and ignoring other more basic forms. While the "Recommendations" section doesn't mention GPS specifically, it is filled mostly with comments about overreliance on one form. The issue is not that GPS itself is flawed, its relying on only one form. Thus the recommendations aren't specific about GPS, they apply to GPS, Loran, Glosnoss, or any other system that might be used. So you turn on 3 gps's for a day sail? I think you'd be better served by brushing up on more basic skills. No I use 2 GPS for serious navigation and hold a third in reserve. Both active GPS have the same way points set. The position of the hand held is plotted on the chart. And all this is cross checked with eye and radar. I use true headings unless we have to hand steer when we work out the magnetic. When I go day sailing in Long Beach I may not crack open a chart or turn on a GPS. I can drive a boat just like you do. On a clear day in a familiar port I need little navigation help from anything. Don't presume what I do - If I'm just taking a spin around the inner harbor I might not have a chart on deck, but in the outer harbor, which I've sailed for 40 years, I always have a chart on deck. For longer trips, or if fog is possible, I'll usually have GPS and radar setup, but I'll also have pencil, dividers and parallel rules on hand. And at least one trip I year I leave the GPS and radar below, and formally plot the course at the helm. I have to get in at least one running fix a year! When is the last time you did a running fix? Could your "students" do one if the GPS failed? Do they even know what it is? |
otnmbrd wrote:
Rodney Myrvaagnes wrote: According to the report, the loran was behaving correctly near Nantucket, where it mattered. Nobody believed it. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a G GPS Centric Nobody actually checked the Loran until after the grounding, when it revealed a 15 mile error. The depth sounder was on but the alarm was turned off. The radar did not show the entrance buoy in the correct place, and that was ignored. Lights on Nantucket were seen when they should have been 30 miles away. GPS Centric |
Dave wrote:
Technophobe? I love it! You should realize that 25 years ago I was programing spacecraft navigation for NASA. I'm now retired from IBM after spending about 30 years working on cutting edge technology. I'm not afraid of technology, I just have a realistic view of its limitations. Hear hear. 40 year ago I was writing in assembler for a then state-of-the-art scientific computer the size of a medium sized desk. 15 years ago, as a hobby, I was writing assembler and a couple of other languages for a z-80 based machine. Technophobe indeed. A Z-80? Wow, 15 years ago that was already obsolete, given that Windows 3 and OS/2 were already running on 486's by then. What are you, a technophobe?? Let's see, 40 years ago - the IBM 1620 was over the hill, the 1401 was commonly used but hardly "state of the art." The 7090 was bigger than a desk, as was the CDC 6600. Maybe the 360, though you would have had to be special to see one in 1965. I'll guess one of the early Digital's, like the PDP 7 or 8. |
On 25 Jan 2005 15:55:04 -0600, Dave wrote:
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 16:16:50 -0500, Jeff Morris said: Yes. On thinking about it it was the early 80s. Remember the Timex Sinclair and the Tandy TRS-80? My first was an Osborne Model 1. I thought it was great! The 5 inch floppies (really floppy) cost $10 (cdn) and held 92K. The screen was just a bit small. Jack |
Jack Dale wrote:
On 25 Jan 2005 15:55:04 -0600, Dave wrote: On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 16:16:50 -0500, Jeff Morris said: Yes. On thinking about it it was the early 80s. Remember the Timex Sinclair and the Tandy TRS-80? My first was an Osborne Model 1. I thought it was great! The 5 inch floppies (really floppy) cost $10 (cdn) and held 92K. The screen was just a bit small. Jack I remember how everyone was so excited about the Osborne because we finaly had a portable computer! The neat thing about the Osborne is that you could program it to make any format floppy. In those days, each manufacturer had a different track/sector format - with the Osborne you could create any format. |
On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 18:35:45 -0500, Jeff Morris
wrote: Jack Dale wrote: On 25 Jan 2005 15:55:04 -0600, Dave wrote: On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 16:16:50 -0500, Jeff Morris said: Yes. On thinking about it it was the early 80s. Remember the Timex Sinclair and the Tandy TRS-80? My first was an Osborne Model 1. I thought it was great! The 5 inch floppies (really floppy) cost $10 (cdn) and held 92K. The screen was just a bit small. Jack I remember how everyone was so excited about the Osborne because we finaly had a portable computer! Since it weighed as much as a sewing machine, a more appropriate phrase is "transportable." I took it to work to calculate marks. I remember using z scores to scale marks. I bought it after a student submitted a word processed essay (TRS 80). And I realized that I could not mark the spelling on his essay. Should I mark spelling on the others' essays? I began to realize that these things might have an impact on learning and teaching. Jack |
On 25 Jan 2005 15:55:04 -0600, Dave wrote:
Don't remember what it was. 1620 sounds vaguely familiar. It was a "scientific" computer, and we programmed it to do mortality tables for an insurance company. I do remember that is was in a carefully temperature controlled space, and the way we programmed it was to hand sheets with the instructions to a punchcard operator who punched the cards and had them fed into the machine overnight so we got a printout of the results in the morning. Time was far too expensive to let the programmers anywhere near the machine itself. You describe the 1620 perfectly. It was even shaped like a desk with a selectric on the desk for operator input. The punch-card reader/puncher was another box about the same size. Rodney Myrvaagnes NYC J36 Gjo/a "Accordions don't play 'Lady of Spain.' People play 'Lady of Spain." |
Sound like a 650 to me and you probably used fortran.
JR Dave wrote: On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 16:16:50 -0500, Jeff Morris said: A Z-80? Wow, 15 years ago that was already obsolete, given that Windows 3 and OS/2 were already running on 486's by then. What are you, a technophobe?? Yes. On thinking about it it was the early 80s. Remember the Timex Sinclair and the Tandy TRS-80? Let's see, 40 years ago - the IBM 1620 was over the hill, the 1401 was commonly used but hardly "state of the art." The 7090 was bigger than a desk, as was the CDC 6600. Maybe the 360, though you would have had to be special to see one in 1965. I'll guess one of the early Digital's, like the PDP 7 or 8. Don't remember what it was. 1620 sounds vaguely familiar. It was a "scientific" computer, and we programmed it to do mortality tables for an insurance company. I do remember that is was in a carefully temperature controlled space, and the way we programmed it was to hand sheets with the instructions to a punchcard operator who punched the cards and had them fed into the machine overnight so we got a printout of the results in the morning. Time was far too expensive to let the programmers anywhere near the machine itself. |
Dave wrote:
Yes. On thinking about it it was the early 80s. Remember the Timex Sinclair and the Tandy TRS-80? I think I had a Sinclair, but I don't remember it much. I kind of poo-poo'd the early hobby machines because I had a Digital 11/23 at home, and my partner had a DG Nova 1200. Our first "small" machine was a DEC "Robin," a VT100 with a Z80 CP/M machine tucked in. .... Time was far too expensive to let the programmers anywhere near the machine itself. After several years of cards decks and 300 baud phone lines, my first real programming job was with a DG mini-computer where we "owned" the machine 100%. It was a real trip to see the lights flash as I ran my program. I never went back to the "mainframe world" after that. |
Jr Gilbreath wrote:
Sound like a 650 to me and you probably used fortran. JR Was that the one with the drum memory, so programming it efficiently meant understanding how much the drum went around during each instruction? Fortunately that was a bit before my time. My first programming was on a 1620 in 1963, but it wasn't state of the art then- it was more like a glorified card reader with Fortran programed in with a punch board. I independently derived the "Bubble Sort" on that machine! |
Right, It was a drum machine. Actually it was before my time also. We
had a IBM 1410 40k for normal processing and the actuaries used the 650. We wrote in autocoder for the 1410. It was amazing how much program you could put in 40k. Jeff Morris wrote: Jr Gilbreath wrote: Sound like a 650 to me and you probably used fortran. JR Was that the one with the drum memory, so programming it efficiently meant understanding how much the drum went around during each instruction? Fortunately that was a bit before my time. My first programming was on a 1620 in 1963, but it wasn't state of the art then- it was more like a glorified card reader with Fortran programed in with a punch board. I independently derived the "Bubble Sort" on that machine! |
Jim Donohue wrote:
Sure they were. by the time they were 200 miles out they had a multiple mile error. The chief officier and navigator both stated that a cross check of the LORAN was done. The second officier stated the LORAN was used only as a backup to the GPS. The NTSB found that the LORAN was never checked and should have been. The 2M IS the navigator. At any rate, in the past, occasional multi mile variances between GPS and Loran, though not common, did occur .... frequently when working the limits of Loran ranges. So, a variance was not necessarily a "drop dead". What it was, was cause to check systems and do concurrent plots to see if it corrected .... they did not. They had failure indicators staring them in the face the whole time. They just never looked. Makes little difference what the failure is if the indicator is not noted. Complacency ..... it'll bite you in the ass at the worst possible moment. If you are going to be navigating, you want back-ups to your back-ups. Sure, You can carry 20 hand helds and 4 cases of batteries, but what happens when the Chit, negatively hits the fan and all you know is GPS? No they were simply not very competent. They were plotting the positions hourly...but taking the positon from the busted system. Plotting the positon from one of your 20 handhelds would have blown the whistle before they were an hour into the failure. I can't remember if they were transferring plots from the plotter to paper charts. No matter, doesn't matter if it was a hand held or Loran, a plot from either would/should start mental alarms ringing. What happens when the system fails and you are not aware of it and you go merrily on your way, believing it's working? No, they were GPS Centric. They believed everything was fine, when a system check would have said otherwise. They didn't use back-ups/double checks, they believed the GPS would always work so consequently the integrated nav system must be correct and never needed checking on, for whatever reason. Basically what I'm saying is go back to the first basic error. The GPS wasn't working, no one checked to see if it was... they were "centric" in that they assumed it would be, when in truth, for any number of reasons it may not be and the prudent navigator realizes this and checks, especially in areas such as the Nantucket-Boston Safety Fairway. otn And a major finding was that the system design was deficient in a number of human factor ways that provided the environment for the grounding. For instance the GPS had a suitable external alarm...which was not hooked up. The report strongly suggest that redundant receivers should also have been part of the system. The system should have cross checked the LORAN and the GPS. All kind of simple stuff. Yes to all, however, the officers should also have been doing this since otn's law applies (anything designed by man, built by man, operated by man, and maintained by man, is subject to catastrophic failure, for any of the above reasons.) and THEY were part of the alarm system, since alarm systems are known to fail. otn |
As I have pointed out before Jeff you simply read the conclusion you have
already reached into the data. But I will try once more though it will likely do little good. "Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: Calling it a "system" was a euphemism. It was a GPS attached to an autopilot. They ignored the depth sounder, the radar, and visual cues. Actually, the same thing could have happened to most anyone with an Autohelm and a Garmin, except the the Autohelm (now Raymarine) gives a better indication of faulty input. Neither the page of causals nor the 3 pages of recommendations has a single mention of the term GPS...not one. There were a number of failures but not one that indicates GPS was a problem. Incompetent seamanship is the proximate cause with poorly designed and poorly operated equipment creating the opportunity for the incompetent seaman to ground the boat. You've made this claim several times and its total Bull****! You're claiming, in essence, that because the satellites broadcast a good signal, there is no problem with over-reliance on GPS. This is a textbook case in what can go wrong with such over-reliance. The bizarre thing here is that on one hand you've been arguing that GPS should be learned first because it is nearly perfect, but then here you're claiming that the problem was the "incompetent seaman" who relied too much on GPS. To the contrary...two GPSs integrated into the system would have fully solved the problem. Or integrating the LORAN would have worked as well. There are places where the LORAN would not work so for a broad solution it is not as useful as the second GPS. But two GPS or three GPS and the LORAN would have been fine. We agree they were over-reliant on the automatic bridge system. We agree that they should not have been dependent on a single navigational device. But this single device reliance is a fault of the bridge system design not the GPS. If either the LORAN or, better, a second GPS the failure would not have occurred. We would also suggest an automatic cross check or at least a manual one was a minimum requirement for the operation of the bridge. The automatic bridge system was defective and the staff incompetent...what more needs to be said? In the "Conclusions" section of the report the NTSB describes what happened and what went wrong. The majority of the 22 conclusions talk about the failure of the GPS (mentioning it specifically) system or the failure to double check by other means, i.e. the over-reliance on one system. Here's some examples: 5. Had the fathometer alarm been set to 3 meters, as was the stated practice, or had the second officer chosen to display the fathometer data on the control console, he would have been alerted that the Royal Majesty was in far shallower water than expected and, thus, was off course. He would have been alerted perhaps as long as 40 minutes before the grounding, and the situation could have been corrected. Nothing GPS...simply incompetent bridge operation. 6. The watch officers’ monitoring of the status of the vessel’s global positioning system was deficient throughout the voyage from St. George’s. Does mention GPS but is actually directed at the monitoring of the system. Suggests the monitoring was deficient not the GPS. 7. Deliberate cross checking between the global positioning system and the Loran-C to verify the Royal Majesty’s position was not being performed and should have been on the voyage from St. George’s. Such a procedure supposedly existed according to the Navigator and Chief Officier. So failure to follow established procedures indicts the GPS? Nahh 8. Even though it is likely that the watch officers were not aware of the limitation inherent in using the position-fix alarm to monitor the accuracy of GPS position data, it was inappropriate for them to rely solely on the alarm to warn them of any problems with the GPS data. Are boys did not know how the system worked. Clearly not a GPS problem. The appropriate handling of alarms and errors is a bridge sytem problem. 9. The sighting of lights not normally observed in the traffic lanes, the second officer’s inability to confirm the presence of the BB buoy, and the sighting of blue and white water should have taken precedence over the automation display on the central console and compelled the second officer to promptly use all available means to verify his position. The incompetence included denying the obvious. That is not a GPS problem. 10. The chief officer and the second officer did not observe good watchkeeping practices or act with heightened awareness of the precautions that are needed when a vessel approaches the Boston traffic lanes and landfall. Not a GPS problem. 11. The master’s methods for monitoring the progress of the voyage did not account for the technical capabilities and limitations of the automated equipment. That was really dumb...using a system as the input to a check on its own accuracy. Dumb. 12. The watch officers on the Royal Majesty may have believed that because the global positioning system had demonstrated sufficient reliability over 3 1/2 years, the traditional practice of using at least two independent sources of position information was not necessary. That is a breakdown in the capabilities of the officiers not the GPS. 13. All the watchstanding officers were overly reliant on the automated position display of the navigation and command system 25 and were, for all intents and purposes, sailing the map display instead of using navigation aids or lookout information. Yes they were not competent sailors. The report continues with other items in the same vein, though focused more on the problems with the integrated system and the training, such as: 16. Had the navigation and command system 25 autopilot been configured to compare position data from multiple independent position receivers and had a corresponding alarm been installed that activated when discrepancies were detected, the grounding of the Royal Majesty may have been avoided. These independent position receivers would likely be multiple GPS with (perhaps) a LORAN. Remember LORAN is not an all areas system. They would have almost certainly prevented this problem whether or not a LORAN was included. Although the "Probable Cause" section which follows does not mention GPS specifically, it is quite short (two small paragraphs) and mentions simply "overreliance on the automated features of the integrated bridge system," the lack of training, and the failure to take "corrective action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course." In other words, they relied too much on one source of position (the gps) and ignored others. While the "Recommendations" section does not mention GPS specifically, it clearly recommends against over reliance on one system. We've never claimed there was anything "wrong" with GPS, only that other forms of navigation are just as important. The report includes comments like: Actually I think it says one should not rely on a single input device. Multiple GPS are much more likely the solution then GPS and something else. Review the bridge watchstanding practices on all its vessels, and revise, as necessary, to ensure that all watch officers adhere to sound watchstanding practices and procedures, including using landmarks, soundings, and navigational aids to verify a vessel’s position, relying on more than one source for position information, and reporting to the master any failure to detect important navigational aids. ... As I have said before failure to look out the window and at the RADAR and using what you see to verify that all is working correctly is incompetence upon the part of a bridge officier. As part of the foreign flag passenger ship control verification examination program, verify that the watchstanding procedures of ships’ officers include the use of multiple independent means of position verification. It is true that the bulk of the recommendations have to do with better standards for automated systems, but even then it deals largely with the need to use more than one form of input: comparing position-receiver data for significant discrepancies between position receivers, and subsequent positive annunciation to the crew; It says nothing as far as I can determine about different "forms" of input. It suggests multiple receivers. I would think the mostly likely of this would be multiple GPS. Sorry Jim, its clear that you've been disingenuous with us. The NTSB study is quite specific in finding fault with relying completely on GPS. Though they don't fault the GPS system itself (i.e. the signal leaving the satellite) they make it quite clear the overreliance on one electronic navigation system was the cause of the grounding. And again you read what you believe not what is there. The NTSB believes the input should have been redundant both in the automatic system and on the bridge. So do I. You believe some other "form" should have been integrated. I believe it was integrated in bridge procedures but was not performed. Another "form" was not needed though it was there. What was needed was a level of redundancy either through the system or bridge operation or, even better, through both. Again the system was deficient as was crew performance. Jim |
What did I miss? You were not teaching basic navigation without the use of
electronics? Have I misunderstood your intent? Does your daughter use her GPS with as much skill as she does the boat's compass? She will navigate as comfortably in low visibility as she does in CAVU? Jim "Dave" wrote in message ... On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 00:25:10 -0800, "Jim Donohue" said: So again we disagree. The instructor wanted to teach without the use of the electronic navigation systems...I consider this nonsense. I think you need to read a bit more carefully. Look at what I wrote, not what you imagined might furnish an excuse for a tirade. Dave |
Remco Moedt wrote:
GPS might be too precise, though.... I know a few people using a bouy as a waypoint using a GPS coupled to an autosteer......well, they sure did find out when that waypoint was reached.....g I've noticed the same phenomenon around "convenient" round number lat & long positions that make useful waypoints. Seems there are 3 or 4 boats all converging on the same spot on the water that made such a convenient waypoint to enter. Evan Gatehouse |
"Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: The question isn't what should be used first; the question is what should be taught first. Your inability to understand that is beyond jaxian. Teaching someone GPS before basic piloting is like teaching children how to use a calculator before teaching them the addition table. We disagree..not about the need to teach piloting but upon the base on which you develop that piloting skill. DR is simply the technique that is adopted between fixes to plot ones position for the period of time until a new fix is available. But an electronic navigation system provides continuous position fixes...so DR really has no place. Absolute nonsense. Dead reckoning (DR) determines position by advancing a known positon for courses and distances. A position so determined is called a dead reckoning (DR) position. It is generally accepted that only course and speed determine the DR position. Correcting the DR position for leeway, current effects, and steering error result in an estimated positon (EP). An inertial navigator develops an extremely accurate EP. - Bowditch LOPs and such come up in piloting and I agree that one uses whatever is available and reasonable to maintain a cross check. The eye is a very useful tool for this when visibility is adequate. Radar also can well provide such a cross check. When running multiple electronic navigation systems they can cross check each other. All of these skills should be taught. I have this strange feeling you guys are taking this position because you feel, as I do, that GPS based navigation is easier to teach and to do than non electronic piloting. So the real reason you want non-electronic first is so the new students have to suffer like you did. Not at all. My only desire is to have the best navigators out on the water. Perhaps you should look at the curriculum of the Power Squadron, or the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Although both offer "quicky" courses for GPS, acknowledging that many boaters will only tolerate a few hours of instruction, their full courses follow the tradition path of charts, compasses, DR and piloting before introducing GPS. I am familar with all of these course. When I took all the CGaux courses that made sense. It no longer does. I suspect they will get to it eventually but it will be a few years yet. Actually, the case was that someone was learning how to do LOP's and DR and wasn't interested in LORAN. You called this "utter nonsense." I call your attitude "sheer stupidity." So again we disagree. The instructor wanted to teach without the use of the electronic navigation systems...I consider this nonsense. You end up with a less trained student who initially is far less able to navigate. Why would one teach a student to navigate so as to get an inferior outcome at least during the initial phases of training? I would want them as capable as possible as early as possible for the sake of their and others safety. You should re-read the original post and your response. And you should read the thread to that point as well. ... Uhhh where did it state that learning LOPs and DR was "utter nonsense"? I think I made such a comment about teaching a student navigation with such techniques emphasized to the exclusion of electronic navigation. Still do. Perhaps you should re-read your fist post in this thread. Dave said his daughter was enjoying learning LOP's and DR, and wasn't interested in the Loran. Your response was "Ohh stop...what utter nonsense." You went on to spew more silliness which only served to make you feel important and make everyone else think you're a fool. The remark was in the context of claiming to teach navigation without the electronic systems. Dave was featuring it as a good thing. I believe it a bad thing. Leads to a new sailor with more limited skills than if taught the electronic approach up front. Your approach pretty much guarantees that most students will never learn the basics. It's a good thing the most teachers disagree with you. Many agree with me. Eventually it is the way it will go. Nowhere was it mentioned that Dave's daughter would not go on to learn other techniques, or that she was even destined to be a boat's navigator. It was only stated that she enjoyed learning basic piloting. Frankly criticizing anyone for wanting to learn almost anything is a mark of a very small mind. And you technophobes lack the prospective to see the outcome of your teaching primary dependence on outdated technology. Technophobe? I love it! You should realize that 25 years ago I was programing spacecraft navigation for NASA. I'm now retired from IBM after spending about 30 years working on cutting edge technology. What you did for a living has little to do with technophobe views. Lots of intellectual bigots in the technical ranks. NASA? That the guys so good at O ring design? I'm not afraid of technology, I just have a realistic view of its limitations. I have enough experience in high tech to note that the ability of technologist to understand what they wrought was very limited. Hell I personally sat for five years on what was, at the time, likely the world's best chip design system. I had no idea it was valuable. The way to do this is to actively practice "manual techniques" even while using a GPS. I've never known someone who learned GPS first who did this. However, once you have actually navigated by LOP's, or following depth contours, or watching "danger bearings," it starts to become automatic. When I see a buoy line up with a point of land, I mentally follow the line on the chart and check the depth I should be in. It only takes a second, but would someone who had never done that "for real" bother to do it? And it does for electronic navigators as well. You learn to correlate the views of the eye and other devices with the GPS or whatever. This is exactly what I've been talking about. My point has been that those who learn GPS first don't bother to learn this. Everyone learns it to one degree or another. It is not optional. Calling it a "system" was a euphemism. It was a GPS attached to an autopilot. They ignored the depth sounder, the radar, and visual cues. Actually, the same thing could have happened to most anyone with an Autohelm and a Garmin, except the the Autohelm (now Raymarine) gives a better indication of faulty input. Neither the page of causals nor the 3 pages of recommendations has a single mention of the term GPS...not one. There were a number of failures but not one that indicates GPS was a problem. Incompetent seamanship is the proximate cause with poorly designed and poorly operated equipment creating the opportunity for the incompetent seaman to ground the boat. Refer to my other post on this. Its pretty clear that you're blatantly lying here - the page on conclusions talks mostly about the problem of relying too much on GPS. The "Cause" section very short and though it doesn't mention GPS by name, it is explicit in blaming overreliance on one form of navigation and ignoring other more basic forms. While the "Recommendations" section doesn't mention GPS specifically, it is filled mostly with comments about overreliance on one form. The issue is not that GPS itself is flawed, its relying on only one form. Thus the recommendations aren't specific about GPS, they apply to GPS, Loran, Glosnoss, or any other system that might be used. You still see what you want to see. Find me a use of the word "form". They want redundancy not differing technology. Here is an actual quote from part of the recommendations: "Also as a result of the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the Propose to the International Maritime Organization that it develop standards for integrated bridge system design that will require · multiple independent position-receiver inputs;" See "form" mentioned there anywhere? So you turn on 3 gps's for a day sail? I think you'd be better served by brushing up on more basic skills. No I use 2 GPS for serious navigation and hold a third in reserve. Both active GPS have the same way points set. The position of the hand held is plotted on the chart. And all this is cross checked with eye and radar. I use true headings unless we have to hand steer when we work out the magnetic. When I go day sailing in Long Beach I may not crack open a chart or turn on a GPS. I can drive a boat just like you do. On a clear day in a familiar port I need little navigation help from anything. Don't presume what I do - If I'm just taking a spin around the inner harbor I might not have a chart on deck, but in the outer harbor, which I've sailed for 40 years, I always have a chart on deck. For longer trips, or if fog is possible, I'll usually have GPS and radar setup, but I'll also have pencil, dividers and parallel rules on hand. And at least one trip I year I leave the GPS and radar below, and formally plot the course at the helm. I have to get in at least one running fix a year! I can see you now...afloat in your jacuzzi with the plotting board affixed to the stomach. dividers and parallel rules at the ready. If the fog should roll in you will plot your course and make it to the stairs. Must inhibit enjoyment a bit. When is the last time you did a running fix? Could your "students" do one if the GPS failed? Do they even know what it is? Well given your lack of knowledge of what DR is what can you expect of my students?..of which there are actually a few...but only in the deep blue out of sight of land. And if the GPS fails and the other GPS fails and the other GPS fails...then they will have to resort to DR cause there is obviously not the least chance that LORAN or RADAR is working. So pick up the chart. Note your position and do whatever is needed to get somewhere save. Under those conditions I would be more than content if they figure out a way to get a fix or two. "Running" would be gilding the lily. Jim |
"Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message ... On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 00:47:33 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message . .. On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 11:47:55 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message m... On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 04:49:38 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: One uses all reasonable methods available. The first and primary of these is GPS. Your inablity to understand this simple statement is almost jaxian. Wow, we're making progress. So you finally do agree with the rest of everyone else here that, while it's fine to have GPS as a primary means of navigation, relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy. Bull Steve...you Luddites simply read to confirm your opinions. I have never anywhere suggested any such thing. Did you notice that Jeff Morris cannot even read an NTSB report without getting it wrong? The actual conclusions do not meet his pre-conception so he simply misquotes them. You technophobes are all alike. That's a shame, progress cancelled. I guess I'll take you at your word when you claim just above that you never anywhere suggested relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy ... even though just above that you said one uses all reasonable methods [of navigation] available. Ok, its true that the two statements are not exactly the same thing so it's ok for you to say on the one hand that one uses all reasonable methods available and on the other hand expouse that it's not foolhardy to rely totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods. However, the fact that you are the *only* one here (as far as I can tell) who feels that way should tell you something. The report does not mention GPS or GPS centric in its Causals or 3 pages of recommendations. The ship had procedures to cross check which were not followed. They had a working LORAN showing multiple miles of differential from the GPS. They never looked even though it was supposedly a regular procedure. I am sure there were radar navigation discrepancies as well. And the officiers reported the sighting of two buoys that were not there. Sounds like a pretty high level of incompetence to me...not relying on a single method. Ok, let's do it this way and ask you a simple direct question: Do you feel that going to sea and relying on GPS as your sole means of navigation to the exclusion of all others (even if you take 3 recievers of different models) is prudent seamanship or foolhardy? Steve This discussion suffers from a lack of precision. Going to sea in my context means multiple days at sea out of sight of land. For this I would require charts and multiple GPS. I would take my eyes and a magnetic compass or two. I would prefer to have a RADAR but consider it primarily a collision avoidance device in this context. I would not turn around and run home if my RADAR died the first day out. I would also not leave without a working fathometer. I would not abort if it failed early. I would go with or without celestial and LORAN. So basically I would feel comfortable with Charts, GPS, Magnetic compass and my eyes. If I had LORAN I would use it at least periodically. I would use a celestial capability only in a lifeboat situation or for hobbyist stuff. For coastal work I would prefer the RADAR be operative but would again not abort if it failed early. I would require a fathometer to depart and would make for a safe and easy intermediate destination if I was without depth capablity. So again charts, multiple GPS, magnetic compass, fathometer, and eyes. If I had a LORAN available I would use it. For entering a tricky harbor at night in a storm I would want charts, multiple GPS, radar and a fathometer. If everything was not working well I wait for morning. So what I think is required is situation dependent. I would however always require charts, redundant GPS and a magnetic compass for anything other than a day sail. Jim |
Jim Donohue wrote:
... [yeah, yeah ...] I suspect Jim could get you back safely. What I cannot understand is why anyone would ever leave harbor with him in the first place. -- Good luck and good sailing. s/v Kerry Deare of Barnegat http://kerrydeare.home.comcast.net/ |
Jim Donohue wrote:
As I have pointed out before Jeff you simply read the conclusion you have already reached into the data. But I will try once more though it will likely do little good. You've created quite a "straw man" argument here. You keep assuming that my position is that GPS is "flawed" as so you keep pointing out reasons why problems associated with are really the fault of something else, not the GPS. I've never denied that GPS is the most accurate, and the most reliable (by some measures). My issue has been the over-reliance on one mode of navigation, and the best sequence of education to avoid problems. Perhaps we should go back to the beginning of this particular issue. I said, "The NTSB study blamed several "probable causes:" over reliance on GPS, and lack of training of the officers, and the failure to recognize the problem from other cues." You responded with "Find for me any mention of over reliance on GPS." In fact, I believe I found a number of places where they say just that. "Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: .... You've made this claim several times and its total Bull****! You're claiming, in essence, that because the satellites broadcast a good signal, there is no problem with over-reliance on GPS. This is a textbook case in what can go wrong with such over-reliance. The bizarre thing here is that on one hand you've been arguing that GPS should be learned first because it is nearly perfect, but then here you're claiming that the problem was the "incompetent seaman" who relied too much on GPS. To the contrary...two GPSs integrated into the system would have fully solved the problem. Or integrating the LORAN would have worked as well. You're right. There are any number of possible changes that would have prevented this particular grounding. What will prevent the next? How about looking at the depth sounder as you approach shore? How about noticing that the island that was sighted should have been 30 miles away? There are places where the LORAN would not work so for a broad solution it is not as useful as the second GPS. But two GPS or three GPS and the LORAN would have been fine. Unless someone spilled a Pepsi on the control panel and popped a fuse. You don't understand failure analysis, do you? We agree they were over-reliant on the automatic bridge system. We agree that they should not have been dependent on a single navigational device. But this single device reliance is a fault of the bridge system design not the GPS. Again with the "straw man" argument! If either the LORAN or, better, a second GPS the failure would not have occurred. We would also suggest an automatic cross check or at least a manual one was a minimum requirement for the operation of the bridge. The automatic bridge system was defective and the staff incompetent...what more needs to be said? What a tangled web you're weaving here! When I first heard of the accident (lots of coverage here in Boston, of course) I was appalled that they would have made the approach without once looking at the depth sounder to verify they were in the channel. One minute of human intervention, using a technique that should have been second nature to any experienced boater. And you're claiming that that should not have been necessary - what was needed was two GPS's and a LORAN, all powered presumably by separate power sources, feed a computer that will compare and sound the alarm if there;s a discrepancy. And if the computer fails? NASA's approach for Apollo was to use 5 360's for double redundancy plus cross checking. (Not to mention links to other locations in the country that could take over.) Fortunately, they remembered to include some eyeball navigation tools or Apollo 13 would not have returned. And, while you might be able to make a case that such equipment is appropriate for a cruise ship, we're still a few years away from having this for the average boater. In the "Conclusions" section of the report the NTSB describes what happened and what went wrong. The majority of the 22 conclusions talk about the failure of the GPS (mentioning it specifically) system or the failure to double check by other means, i.e. the over-reliance on one system. Here's some examples: 5. Had the fathometer alarm been set to 3 meters, as was the stated practice, or had the second officer chosen to display the fathometer data on the control console, he would have been alerted that the Royal Majesty was in far shallower water than expected and, thus, was off course. He would have been alerted perhaps as long as 40 minutes before the grounding, and the situation could have been corrected. Nothing GPS...simply incompetent bridge operation. Failure to use traditional piloting techniques. One for me! 6. The watch officers’ monitoring of the status of the vessel’s global positioning system was deficient throughout the voyage from St. George’s. Does mention GPS but is actually directed at the monitoring of the system. Suggests the monitoring was deficient not the GPS. Assuming the GPS was perfect. Another for me! 7. Deliberate cross checking between the global positioning system and the Loran-C to verify the Royal Majesty’s position was not being performed and should have been on the voyage from St. George’s. Such a procedure supposedly existed according to the Navigator and Chief Officier. So failure to follow established procedures indicts the GPS? Nahh Yup! Overreliance on one technique - this is a perfect example. Another for me! 8. Even though it is likely that the watch officers were not aware of the limitation inherent in using the position-fix alarm to monitor the accuracy of GPS position data, it was inappropriate for them to rely solely on the alarm to warn them of any problems with the GPS data. Are boys did not know how the system worked. Clearly not a GPS problem. The appropriate handling of alarms and errors is a bridge sytem problem. What? You're admitting that its possible to make a mistake using GPS? but, you said it was perfect! Maybe, if the had used more than one technique ... Score one more for me! 9. The sighting of lights not normally observed in the traffic lanes, the second officer’s inability to confirm the presence of the BB buoy, and the sighting of blue and white water should have taken precedence over the automation display on the central console and compelled the second officer to promptly use all available means to verify his position. The incompetence included denying the obvious. That is not a GPS problem. So your point is that GPS is perfect, its the humans that caused all of the problems. But it was the GPS system that "mislabeled" the buoys on the chart. How was this not a GPS problem? Score one more for me! 10. The chief officer and the second officer did not observe good watchkeeping practices or act with heightened awareness of the precautions that are needed when a vessel approaches the Boston traffic lanes and landfall. Not a GPS problem. You're correct. This is a problem with overreliance on GPS, just like I've been saying. Score another for me. 11. The master’s methods for monitoring the progress of the voyage did not account for the technical capabilities and limitations of the automated equipment. That was really dumb...using a system as the input to a check on its own accuracy. Dumb. Yes, it was dumb to rely on the GPS. Just as I've been saying. 12. The watch officers on the Royal Majesty may have believed that because the global positioning system had demonstrated sufficient reliability over 3 1/2 years, the traditional practice of using at least two independent sources of position information was not necessary. That is a breakdown in the capabilities of the officiers not the GPS. 13. All the watchstanding officers were overly reliant on the automated position display of the navigation and command system 25 and were, for all intents and purposes, sailing the map display instead of using navigation aids or lookout information. Yes they were not competent sailors. Agreeing, they relied on the GPS and ignored basic piloting techniques. Just as I've been saying. The report continues with other items in the same vein, though focused more on the problems with the integrated system and the training, such as: 16. Had the navigation and command system 25 autopilot been configured to compare position data from multiple independent position receivers and had a corresponding alarm been installed that activated when discrepancies were detected, the grounding of the Royal Majesty may have been avoided. These independent position receivers would likely be multiple GPS with (perhaps) a LORAN. Remember LORAN is not an all areas system. They would have almost certainly prevented this problem whether or not a LORAN was included. Actually this was an "operator setting" that was at the ship's officers discretion. They decided that the GPS alone was sufficient. Nothing wrong with multiple GPS's until the GPS system hiccups. Even if it stays up 99.99% of the time, there could be hundreds of boats negotiating a channel at the time. And the display computer provides a "single failure point," and the antenna feed are probably bundled together, etc., etc. Although the "Probable Cause" section which follows does not mention GPS specifically, it is quite short (two small paragraphs) and mentions simply "overreliance on the automated features of the integrated bridge system," the lack of training, and the failure to take "corrective action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course." In other words, they relied too much on one source of position (the gps) and ignored others. While the "Recommendations" section does not mention GPS specifically, it clearly recommends against over reliance on one system. We've never claimed there was anything "wrong" with GPS, only that other forms of navigation are just as important. The report includes comments like: Actually I think it says one should not rely on a single input device. Multiple GPS are much more likely the solution then GPS and something else. Hopefully not. However, GPS's are so cheap there's nothing wrong with having two. But where LORAN is available, or Glosnoss, or Galileo (if it happens), they should be used. But regardless, there is no excuse for not thinking it odd that a big island is misplaced by 15 miles. Review the bridge watchstanding practices on all its vessels, and revise, as necessary, to ensure that all watch officers adhere to sound watchstanding practices and procedures, including using landmarks, soundings, and navigational aids to verify a vessel’s position, relying on more than one source for position information, and reporting to the master any failure to detect important navigational aids. ... As I have said before failure to look out the window and at the RADAR and using what you see to verify that all is working correctly is incompetence upon the part of a bridge officier. We we agree on that. Overreliance on GPS is bad. As part of the foreign flag passenger ship control verification examination program, verify that the watchstanding procedures of ships’ officers include the use of multiple independent means of position verification. It is true that the bulk of the recommendations have to do with better standards for automated systems, but even then it deals largely with the need to use more than one form of input. comparing position-receiver data for significant discrepancies between position receivers, and subsequent positive annunciation to the crew; It says nothing as far as I can determine about different "forms" of input. It suggests multiple receivers. I would think the mostly likely of this would be multiple GPS. This depends on how you interpret "multiple independent sources." Two GPS's aren't exactly "independent." And they are quite explicit that the traditional piloting techniques should be used to validate the position reported by the automated system. What part of "landmarks, soundings, and navigational aid to verify a vessel's position" do you interpret as meaning two GPS's are sufficient??? Sorry Jim, its clear that you've been disingenuous with us. The NTSB study is quite specific in finding fault with relying completely on GPS. Though they don't fault the GPS system itself (i.e. the signal leaving the satellite) they make it quite clear the overreliance on one electronic navigation system was the cause of the grounding. And again you read what you believe not what is there. The NTSB believes the input should have been redundant both in the automatic system and on the bridge. So do I. You believe some other "form" should have been integrated. I believe it was integrated in bridge procedures but was not performed. Another "form" was not needed though it was there. What was needed was a level of redundancy either through the system or bridge operation or, even better, through both. Again the system was deficient as was crew performance. And how is this not "over reliance on GPS" as I first claimed? You've completely agreed with me on every point, yet you fight on against some "straw man" of your creation. You're a real piece of work, Jim! Jim |
The discussion is the order and emphasis of the learning process. Does not
and did not ever have anything to do with what the end position should be. You use the tools available...but you start the student with the modern position oriented, electronic navigation oriented techniques. And you start with chartmanship...understand them and how to plan and plot a course. Jim "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message ... On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 23:04:05 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message . .. On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 00:47:33 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message m... On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 11:47:55 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: "Steven Shelikoff" wrote in message news:ij2av01tatdvpv90473t1di1btfq03826p@4ax. com... On Mon, 24 Jan 2005 04:49:38 -0800, "Jim Donohue" wrote: One uses all reasonable methods available. The first and primary of these is GPS. Your inablity to understand this simple statement is almost jaxian. Wow, we're making progress. So you finally do agree with the rest of everyone else here that, while it's fine to have GPS as a primary means of navigation, relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy. Bull Steve...you Luddites simply read to confirm your opinions. I have never anywhere suggested any such thing. Did you notice that Jeff Morris cannot even read an NTSB report without getting it wrong? The actual conclusions do not meet his pre-conception so he simply misquotes them. You technophobes are all alike. That's a shame, progress cancelled. I guess I'll take you at your word when you claim just above that you never anywhere suggested relying totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods of navigation is foolhardy ... even though just above that you said one uses all reasonable methods [of navigation] available. Ok, its true that the two statements are not exactly the same thing so it's ok for you to say on the one hand that one uses all reasonable methods available and on the other hand expouse that it's not foolhardy to rely totally on GPS without checking it against other reasonable methods. However, the fact that you are the *only* one here (as far as I can tell) who feels that way should tell you something. The report does not mention GPS or GPS centric in its Causals or 3 pages of recommendations. The ship had procedures to cross check which were not followed. They had a working LORAN showing multiple miles of differential from the GPS. They never looked even though it was supposedly a regular procedure. I am sure there were radar navigation discrepancies as well. And the officiers reported the sighting of two buoys that were not there. Sounds like a pretty high level of incompetence to me...not relying on a single method. Ok, let's do it this way and ask you a simple direct question: Do you feel that going to sea and relying on GPS as your sole means of navigation to the exclusion of all others (even if you take 3 recievers of different models) is prudent seamanship or foolhardy? This discussion suffers from a lack of precision. Going to sea in my context means multiple days at sea out of sight of land. For this I would require charts and multiple GPS. I would take my eyes and a magnetic compass or two. I would prefer to have a RADAR but consider it primarily a collision avoidance device in this context. I would not turn around and run home if my RADAR died the first day out. I would also not leave without a working fathometer. I would not abort if it failed early. I would go with or without celestial and LORAN. So basically I would feel comfortable with Charts, GPS, Magnetic compass and my eyes. If I had LORAN I would use it at least periodically. I would use a celestial capability only in a lifeboat situation or for hobbyist stuff. IMHO, the only thing necessary these days in a lifeboat situation is an EPIRB. Most of the lifeboats we carry have no means of propulsion other than maybe paddling to someplace you can see. Why would I care to know where I am if I can't to where I want to go? For coastal work I would prefer the RADAR be operative but would again not abort if it failed early. I would require a fathometer to depart and would make for a safe and easy intermediate destination if I was without depth capablity. So again charts, multiple GPS, magnetic compass, fathometer, and eyes. If I had a LORAN available I would use it. For entering a tricky harbor at night in a storm I would want charts, multiple GPS, radar and a fathometer. If everything was not working well I wait for morning. So what I think is required is situation dependent. I would however always require charts, redundant GPS and a magnetic compass for anything other than a day sail. So with all of these other things you say you would use (radar, loran, eyes, fathometer, compass, etc.) can you finally get off this GPS is the be-all-end-all means of navigation kick? It sounds like you *want* to agree with everyone else, but can't just to be argumentative. Steve |
Cheap shot...speaking of safety is there any less safe or dumber than single
handling? Jim "Armond Perretta" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: ... [yeah, yeah ...] I suspect Jim could get you back safely. What I cannot understand is why anyone would ever leave harbor with him in the first place. -- Good luck and good sailing. s/v Kerry Deare of Barnegat http://kerrydeare.home.comcast.net/ |
Jim Donohue wrote:
But an electronic navigation system provides continuous position fixes...so DR really has no place. Absolute nonsense. Dead reckoning (DR) determines position by advancing a known positon for courses and distances. A position so determined is called a dead reckoning (DR) position. It is generally accepted that only course and speed determine the DR position. Correcting the DR position for leeway, current effects, and steering error result in an estimated positon (EP). An inertial navigator develops an extremely accurate EP. - Bowditch Wow, you know how to look up Bowditch! But what's your point? From the latest version of Bowditch (2002): "... But its most important use is in projecting the position of the ship into the immediate future and avoiding hazards to navigation." Sounds kind of useful, doesn't it? But you think it "really has no place." It seems to me like you need to go back and take a refresher course on DR and piloting. And: "Until ECDIS is proven to provide the level of safety and accuracy required, the use of a traditional DR plot on paper charts is a prudent backup, especially in restricted waters." In other words, understanding DR is important even while you're using GPS. It would seem that Bowditch agrees that your attitude is complete nonsense. ... So the real reason you want non-electronic first is so the new students have to suffer like you did. Not at all. My only desire is to have the best navigators out on the water. Perhaps you should look at the curriculum of the Power Squadron, or the Coast Guard Auxiliary. Although both offer "quicky" courses for GPS, acknowledging that many boaters will only tolerate a few hours of instruction, their full courses follow the tradition path of charts, compasses, DR and piloting before introducing GPS. I am familar with all of these course. When I took all the CGaux courses that made sense. It no longer does. I suspect they will get to it eventually but it will be a few years yet. Hopefully it will be a long time. Actually, the case was that someone was learning how to do LOP's and DR and wasn't interested in LORAN. You called this "utter nonsense." I call your attitude "sheer stupidity." So again we disagree. The instructor wanted to teach without the use of the electronic navigation systems...I consider this nonsense. You end up with a less trained student who initially is far less able to navigate. Why would one teach a student to navigate so as to get an inferior outcome at least during the initial phases of training? I would want them as capable as possible as early as possible for the sake of their and others safety. You should re-read the original post and your response. And you should read the thread to that point as well. I have. What's your point? Your original post in the thread is still stupid. And yet you still defend even while admitting you don't believe it. Your approach pretty much guarantees that most students will never learn the basics. It's a good thing the most teachers disagree with you. Many agree with me. Eventually it is the way it will go. The Power Squadron, CG Aux, Bowditch are not among those that agree with you. Technophobe? I love it! You should realize that 25 years ago I was programing spacecraft navigation for NASA. I'm now retired from IBM after spending about 30 years working on cutting edge technology. What you did for a living has little to do with technophobe views. Lots of intellectual bigots in the technical ranks. NASA? That the guys so good at O ring design? My mission worked flawlessly. It far exceeded it original mission, and would have survived much longer if the bureaucrats had funded the redundant stabilizing system. As for the O-rings, that was a case of a non-techie ignoring the warnings of the engineer. BTW, I was consulting for Space Telescope when that incident occurred and was the final straw that pushed me into mass-market software. My specialty through the years was debugging problems that other engineers claimed should never happen. As I say, I'm not a technophobe, just a realist! I'm not afraid of technology, I just have a realistic view of its limitations. I have enough experience in high tech to note that the ability of technologist to understand what they wrought was very limited. I see far, far, far more instances of overreliance by people that think they "understand", such as the marketing team for every product I was ever involved with! And it does for electronic navigators as well. You learn to correlate the views of the eye and other devices with the GPS or whatever. This is exactly what I've been talking about. My point has been that those who learn GPS first don't bother to learn this. Everyone learns it to one degree or another. It is not optional. But now you're claiming that piloting need not be taught, because everyone will pick it up eventually. The naivety of this is boggling! You still see what you want to see. Find me a use of the word "form". They want redundancy not differing technology. Here is an actual quote from part of the recommendations: "Also as a result of the investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board makes the Propose to the International Maritime Organization that it develop standards for integrated bridge system design that will require · multiple independent position-receiver inputs;" See "form" mentioned there anywhere? Two GPS's are not "independent." They also talk about the need for traditional piloting techniques: sounding, landmarks, etc. Its you who sees what you want to see. When I go day sailing in Long Beach I may not crack open a chart or turn on a GPS. I can drive a boat just like you do. On a clear day in a familiar port I need little navigation help from anything. Don't presume what I do - If I'm just taking a spin around the inner harbor I might not have a chart on deck, but in the outer harbor, which I've sailed for 40 years, I always have a chart on deck. For longer trips, or if fog is possible, I'll usually have GPS and radar setup, but I'll also have pencil, dividers and parallel rules on hand. And at least one trip I year I leave the GPS and radar below, and formally plot the course at the helm. I have to get in at least one running fix a year! I can see you now...afloat in your jacuzzi with the plotting board affixed to the stomach. dividers and parallel rules at the ready. If the fog should roll in you will plot your course and make it to the stairs. Must inhibit enjoyment a bit. Heh, heh. Good one Jim. I can see your students now: "Hello SeaTow? I dropped my GPS overboard. Can you come get me? I don't know where I am, but there's a lot of water around!" When is the last time you did a running fix? Could your "students" do one if the GPS failed? Do they even know what it is? Well given your lack of knowledge of what DR is Why do you say that? You're the one who doesn't know that it is useful even while using GPS. While you seem to know the words, you forgot the meaning. In fact your ignorance of the meaning of DR is proof that your approached is flawed! what can you expect of my students?..of which there are actually a few...but only in the deep blue out of sight of land. Which is fortunate, because if the approached land they could be in deep ****! And if the GPS fails and the other GPS fails and the other GPS fails...then they will have to resort to DR cause there is obviously not the least chance that LORAN or RADAR is working. So pick up the chart. Note your position and do whatever is needed to get somewhere save. Under those conditions I would be more than content if they figure out a way to get a fix or two. "Running" would be gilding the lily. And when they sight land, call SeaTow! |
Goodness. Is anyone still following this?
-- Roger Long |
As I projected responding will do little good. The way they are fixing
this Jeff...is to plug in multi GPS. Don't you think it odd Jeff that the fix for over-reliance on GPS by making the system even more dependent on GPS. And you do read strangely...multiple independent position receiver inputs...turns automatically in your mind to multiple independent sources...I wonder why this is? Like your use of "form" could it be you can't find the right language so you substitute your own? One of the reviews of this grounding pointed out that weather was in fact a factor. It was so good that the crew was complacent. Given your line of reasoning we could simple claim the good weather made the crew complacent causing all of the other items that you ascribe to over-reliance on GPS. Kind of silly but then so is your interpretation. Why not presume the NTSB people meant what they say? Jim "Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: As I have pointed out before Jeff you simply read the conclusion you have already reached into the data. But I will try once more though it will likely do little good. You've created quite a "straw man" argument here. You keep assuming that my position is that GPS is "flawed" as so you keep pointing out reasons why problems associated with are really the fault of something else, not the GPS. I've never denied that GPS is the most accurate, and the most reliable (by some measures). My issue has been the over-reliance on one mode of navigation, and the best sequence of education to avoid problems. Perhaps we should go back to the beginning of this particular issue. I said, "The NTSB study blamed several "probable causes:" over reliance on GPS, and lack of training of the officers, and the failure to recognize the problem from other cues." You responded with "Find for me any mention of over reliance on GPS." In fact, I believe I found a number of places where they say just that. "Jeff Morris" wrote in message ... Jim Donohue wrote: ... You've made this claim several times and its total Bull****! You're claiming, in essence, that because the satellites broadcast a good signal, there is no problem with over-reliance on GPS. This is a textbook case in what can go wrong with such over-reliance. The bizarre thing here is that on one hand you've been arguing that GPS should be learned first because it is nearly perfect, but then here you're claiming that the problem was the "incompetent seaman" who relied too much on GPS. To the contrary...two GPSs integrated into the system would have fully solved the problem. Or integrating the LORAN would have worked as well. You're right. There are any number of possible changes that would have prevented this particular grounding. What will prevent the next? How about looking at the depth sounder as you approach shore? How about noticing that the island that was sighted should have been 30 miles away? There are places where the LORAN would not work so for a broad solution it is not as useful as the second GPS. But two GPS or three GPS and the LORAN would have been fine. Unless someone spilled a Pepsi on the control panel and popped a fuse. You don't understand failure analysis, do you? We agree they were over-reliant on the automatic bridge system. We agree that they should not have been dependent on a single navigational device. But this single device reliance is a fault of the bridge system design not the GPS. Again with the "straw man" argument! If either the LORAN or, better, a second GPS the failure would not have occurred. We would also suggest an automatic cross check or at least a manual one was a minimum requirement for the operation of the bridge. The automatic bridge system was defective and the staff incompetent...what more needs to be said? What a tangled web you're weaving here! When I first heard of the accident (lots of coverage here in Boston, of course) I was appalled that they would have made the approach without once looking at the depth sounder to verify they were in the channel. One minute of human intervention, using a technique that should have been second nature to any experienced boater. And you're claiming that that should not have been necessary - what was needed was two GPS's and a LORAN, all powered presumably by separate power sources, feed a computer that will compare and sound the alarm if there;s a discrepancy. And if the computer fails? NASA's approach for Apollo was to use 5 360's for double redundancy plus cross checking. (Not to mention links to other locations in the country that could take over.) Fortunately, they remembered to include some eyeball navigation tools or Apollo 13 would not have returned. And, while you might be able to make a case that such equipment is appropriate for a cruise ship, we're still a few years away from having this for the average boater. In the "Conclusions" section of the report the NTSB describes what happened and what went wrong. The majority of the 22 conclusions talk about the failure of the GPS (mentioning it specifically) system or the failure to double check by other means, i.e. the over-reliance on one system. Here's some examples: 5. Had the fathometer alarm been set to 3 meters, as was the stated practice, or had the second officer chosen to display the fathometer data on the control console, he would have been alerted that the Royal Majesty was in far shallower water than expected and, thus, was off course. He would have been alerted perhaps as long as 40 minutes before the grounding, and the situation could have been corrected. Nothing GPS...simply incompetent bridge operation. Failure to use traditional piloting techniques. One for me! 6. The watch officers’ monitoring of the status of the vessel’s global positioning system was deficient throughout the voyage from St. George’s. Does mention GPS but is actually directed at the monitoring of the system. Suggests the monitoring was deficient not the GPS. Assuming the GPS was perfect. Another for me! 7. Deliberate cross checking between the global positioning system and the Loran-C to verify the Royal Majesty’s position was not being performed and should have been on the voyage from St. George’s. Such a procedure supposedly existed according to the Navigator and Chief Officier. So failure to follow established procedures indicts the GPS? Nahh Yup! Overreliance on one technique - this is a perfect example. Another for me! 8. Even though it is likely that the watch officers were not aware of the limitation inherent in using the position-fix alarm to monitor the accuracy of GPS position data, it was inappropriate for them to rely solely on the alarm to warn them of any problems with the GPS data. Are boys did not know how the system worked. Clearly not a GPS problem. The appropriate handling of alarms and errors is a bridge sytem problem. What? You're admitting that its possible to make a mistake using GPS? but, you said it was perfect! Maybe, if the had used more than one technique ... Score one more for me! 9. The sighting of lights not normally observed in the traffic lanes, the second officer’s inability to confirm the presence of the BB buoy, and the sighting of blue and white water should have taken precedence over the automation display on the central console and compelled the second officer to promptly use all available means to verify his position. The incompetence included denying the obvious. That is not a GPS problem. So your point is that GPS is perfect, its the humans that caused all of the problems. But it was the GPS system that "mislabeled" the buoys on the chart. How was this not a GPS problem? Score one more for me! 10. The chief officer and the second officer did not observe good watchkeeping practices or act with heightened awareness of the precautions that are needed when a vessel approaches the Boston traffic lanes and landfall. Not a GPS problem. You're correct. This is a problem with overreliance on GPS, just like I've been saying. Score another for me. 11. The master’s methods for monitoring the progress of the voyage did not account for the technical capabilities and limitations of the automated equipment. That was really dumb...using a system as the input to a check on its own accuracy. Dumb. Yes, it was dumb to rely on the GPS. Just as I've been saying. 12. The watch officers on the Royal Majesty may have believed that because the global positioning system had demonstrated sufficient reliability over 3 1/2 years, the traditional practice of using at least two independent sources of position information was not necessary. That is a breakdown in the capabilities of the officiers not the GPS. 13. All the watchstanding officers were overly reliant on the automated position display of the navigation and command system 25 and were, for all intents and purposes, sailing the map display instead of using navigation aids or lookout information. Yes they were not competent sailors. Agreeing, they relied on the GPS and ignored basic piloting techniques. Just as I've been saying. The report continues with other items in the same vein, though focused more on the problems with the integrated system and the training, such as: 16. Had the navigation and command system 25 autopilot been configured to compare position data from multiple independent position receivers and had a corresponding alarm been installed that activated when discrepancies were detected, the grounding of the Royal Majesty may have been avoided. These independent position receivers would likely be multiple GPS with (perhaps) a LORAN. Remember LORAN is not an all areas system. They would have almost certainly prevented this problem whether or not a LORAN was included. Actually this was an "operator setting" that was at the ship's officers discretion. They decided that the GPS alone was sufficient. Nothing wrong with multiple GPS's until the GPS system hiccups. Even if it stays up 99.99% of the time, there could be hundreds of boats negotiating a channel at the time. And the display computer provides a "single failure point," and the antenna feed are probably bundled together, etc., etc. Although the "Probable Cause" section which follows does not mention GPS specifically, it is quite short (two small paragraphs) and mentions simply "overreliance on the automated features of the integrated bridge system," the lack of training, and the failure to take "corrective action after several cues indicated the vessel was off course." In other words, they relied too much on one source of position (the gps) and ignored others. While the "Recommendations" section does not mention GPS specifically, it clearly recommends against over reliance on one system. We've never claimed there was anything "wrong" with GPS, only that other forms of navigation are just as important. The report includes comments like: Actually I think it says one should not rely on a single input device. Multiple GPS are much more likely the solution then GPS and something else. Hopefully not. However, GPS's are so cheap there's nothing wrong with having two. But where LORAN is available, or Glosnoss, or Galileo (if it happens), they should be used. But regardless, there is no excuse for not thinking it odd that a big island is misplaced by 15 miles. Review the bridge watchstanding practices on all its vessels, and revise, as necessary, to ensure that all watch officers adhere to sound watchstanding practices and procedures, including using landmarks, soundings, and navigational aids to verify a vessel’s position, relying on more than one source for position information, and reporting to the master any failure to detect important navigational aids. ... As I have said before failure to look out the window and at the RADAR and using what you see to verify that all is working correctly is incompetence upon the part of a bridge officier. We we agree on that. Overreliance on GPS is bad. As part of the foreign flag passenger ship control verification examination program, verify that the watchstanding procedures of ships’ officers include the use of multiple independent means of position verification. It is true that the bulk of the recommendations have to do with better standards for automated systems, but even then it deals largely with the need to use more than one form of input. comparing position-receiver data for significant discrepancies between position receivers, and subsequent positive annunciation to the crew; It says nothing as far as I can determine about different "forms" of input. It suggests multiple receivers. I would think the mostly likely of this would be multiple GPS. This depends on how you interpret "multiple independent sources." Two GPS's aren't exactly "independent." And they are quite explicit that the traditional piloting techniques should be used to validate the position reported by the automated system. What part of "landmarks, soundings, and navigational aid to verify a vessel's position" do you interpret as meaning two GPS's are sufficient??? Sorry Jim, its clear that you've been disingenuous with us. The NTSB study is quite specific in finding fault with relying completely on GPS. Though they don't fault the GPS system itself (i.e. the signal leaving the satellite) they make it quite clear the overreliance on one electronic navigation system was the cause of the grounding. And again you read what you believe not what is there. The NTSB believes the input should have been redundant both in the automatic system and on the bridge. So do I. You believe some other "form" should have been integrated. I believe it was integrated in bridge procedures but was not performed. Another "form" was not needed though it was there. What was needed was a level of redundancy either through the system or bridge operation or, even better, through both. Again the system was deficient as was crew performance. And how is this not "over reliance on GPS" as I first claimed? You've completely agreed with me on every point, yet you fight on against some "straw man" of your creation. You're a real piece of work, Jim! Jim |
I did reread the message. I also reread the prior postings in the thread.
Why don't you simply answer the questions asked? Why did you edit the questions? Luddites all seem to have this problem maintaining context when it does not suit their needs. Jim "Dave" wrote in message ... On Tue, 25 Jan 2005 21:57:38 -0800, "Jim Donohue" said: What did I miss? You were not teaching basic navigation without the use of electronics? Have I misunderstood your intent? The message should still be available. It's . If after rereading it you can't figure out what you missed, you're a hopeless case. Dave |
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